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A Rule of Reason Approach to the Antitrust Issues of the
Google Book Search Settlement
Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines, from an antitrust perspective, the recent con-
troversy of the Google Book Search (GBS) settlement in its broader
context of copyright collective administration. It argues that courts
should view competitive concerns of the settlement pertaining to ex-
clusivity and pricing as ancillary restraints to an overall procompeti-
tive copyright collective, and hence courts should analyze the
settlement using the rule of reason instead of condemning it as per se
illegal under antitrust law. In particular, I will examine closely the
following five issues: (1) How does the GBS settlement relate to AS-
CAP and BMI blanket licensing in the music performance context and
copyright collective arrangements in general? (2) Why should courts
apply the rule of reason (as opposed to a per se illegal rule) to analyze
anticompetitive features of the GBS settlement and other copyright
collectives? (3) What is the proper antitrust baseline against which a
rule of reason analysis is conducted? More precisely, should an anti-
trust court ask whether a collective scheme is overall efficiency-en-
hancing or should it look for a "less restrictive alternative" which is
equally capable of achieving procompetitive goals, albeit in a less an-
ticompetitive manner? (4) How should a court identify and weigh an-
ticompetitive justifications and procompetitive objectives of an
ancillary restraint? How can a "reverse" rule of reason be adopted to
help courts and parties to identify efficiency modifications to an ex-
isting collective arrangement? (5) What would be the result if the
rule-of-reason analysis is applied in the specific context of the GBS
settlement in evaluating the competitive effects of allegedly anticom-
petitive restraints and proposed modifications?
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. Part II in-
troduces the background and salient features of the GBS class action
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settlement, and discusses Judge Chin's recent decision to reject the
settlement agreement.' Part III examines the relationship between
the GBS settlement, copyright collective administration, and the anti-
trust rule of reason: specifically, it seeks to draw a comparison be-
tween the GBS settlement and the ASCAP and BMI blanket license
in the music licensing industry, define the proper antitrust baseline for
evaluating ancillary restraints to the GBS settlement as a copyright
collective, and formalize a step-by-step process by which the antitrust
rule of reason (or reverse thereof) should proceed. Part IV applies
the rule of reason framework developed in the previous Part to ana-
lyze two central anticompetitive concerns of the GBS settlement: (1)
Google's de facto exclusivity over orphan works and pricing mecha-
nisms for consumer purchases and institutional subscriptions; and (2)
certain efficiency-enhancing modifications proposed by Google or
commentators which are yet to be implemented as part of the settle-
ment agreement. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE GBS SETTLEMENT
In 2004, Google initiated the Google Books Library Project with
the mission of digitizing millions of books from major research librar-
ies and displaying the text in small "snippets" in response to online
search enquiries.2 The goal of the GBS project was to promote wide
access of books among global readers and researches as well as equali-
zation of resources between libraries and academic institutions all
around the world.3 Google also aimed to bring new life to the myriad
of out-of-print books (including so-called "orphan works" whose
copyright owners cannot be traced), which can only be found in the
largest and most ancient libraries in the world.4 However, Google did
not obtain permission from copyright owners before proceeding to
scan the books, many of which were still in copyright.5 Google's ac-
tions triggered a class action brought by authors and publishers for
copyright infringement, with the rightsholders seeking injunctive relief
and copyright damages.6 Google's primary defense was that the dis-
play of only small sections of a book constituted "fair use" under
1. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2. See, e.g., id.; Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19 (2010-11); Digital Books: A New Chapter, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2008,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/12523914.
3. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 670-71.
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§ 107 of the Copyright Act.7 Indeed, the reporting of search results
itself was likely fair use since the quotations displayed were too frag-
mented to amount to substantial reproduction of a book.8 However,
the focus of the rightsholders' argument was on the acts of scanning
millions of copyrighted books in full and saving them onto Google's
databases.9 These acts undeniably constituted "copying" under copy-
right law, and pleading fair use would be difficult for Google.' 0 In
deciding whether a use is fair or not, courts are required to consider
the four factors stipulated under § 107 of the Copyright Act, namely:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used . . ; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work."" The courts have traditionally
placed more weight on the first factor (purpose and character of the
use) and the fourth factor (market harm) in evaluating claims of fair
use. Since Google's use was both commercial and non-transformative
(verbatim copies of books being made), the Internet company would
bear the burden of proving the absence of market harm.12 The bur-
den would be difficult to discharge given that the court might consider
that the digital library for web search amounted to a viable potential
market for the rightsholders' works.
However, the case did not proceed to trial and the parties began
settlement negotiations after engaging in document discovery.'3
Google, the Authors Guild, and the Association of American Publish-
ers eventually reached a settlement agreement in October 2008.14 The
proposed settlement attracted hundreds of objections and the parties
made modifications to the settlement agreement to address some of
these concerns.' 5 An amended settlement agreement was filed by
Google and the rightsholders in November 2009 pending approval by
the court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Judge Chin, sitting on the Southern District Court for New
York, conducted a fairness hearing in February 2009 after receiving
7. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
8. Sag, supra note 2, at 25.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
12. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (6th Cir.
1996).
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comments from class members and amicus curiae supporting or ob-
jecting the settlement. 16
The following paragraph highlights the salient features of the
amended settlement agreement, a complex document that spans 166
pages. The class is comprised of people who are United States copy-
right holders of one or more books as of January 5, 2009.17 The settle-
ment, therefore, covers both commercially available works and
commercially unavailable works (including orphan works). Google is
authorized to continue scanning these books into digital form but
must seek the express consent of rightsholders before displaying com-
mercially available books as part of web search results, as books on
sale individually (so-called consumer purchases), or as part of a blan-
ket license (so-called institutional subscription).' 8 In other words,
Google may display commercially unavailable works for the purposes
of search or distribution without prior authorization, though their
rightsholders can always opt out of the settlement (before the dead-
line of September 4, 2009) or later request removal of their books
from the Book Rights Registry described below.19 But orphan work
rightsholders have not opted out or come forward to claim their
books, so Google's unqualified right to display and distribute orphan
works in the absence of wholesale competition gives rise to the con-
cern that Google will have a de facto monopoly over such works, an
issue which will be addressed later in this paper. 20 Google is also au-
thorized to make "non-display" uses of all digitized books, which will
be used to build a "Research Corpus" for similar, "non-consumptive"
uses by certain qualified users;21 such alternative uses will be explored
in detail towards the end of this paper.22 The pricing mechanisms of
consumer purchases and institutional subscriptions have also raised
antitrust concerns-their detailed description and analysis will also be
deferred to a later stage of this paper.23 It is, however, important to
note at this juncture that the settlement agreement plans to establish a
Books Rights Registry which will (1) maintain a database of right-
sholders in the class;24 (2) distribute royalties to rightsholders accord-
16. Id.
17. Amended Settlement Agreement § 1.13, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-8136,
2009 WL 5576331 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view
settlement-agreement.html (excluding certain individuals and entities).
18. Id. §§ 1.31, 3.2, 3.3.
19. Id. §§ 1.124, 3.5(a)(i), 10.2(a).
20. See infra Part IV(A).
21. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, §H 1.94, 7.2(d).
22. See infra Part IV(C).
23. See infra IV(B).
24. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 6.1(b).
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ing to a default (and negotiable) revenue split of sixty-three percent to
rightsholders and thirty-seven percent to Google;25 and (3) use "com-
mercially reasonable efforts" to locate rightsholders in order to mini-
mize the number of orphan works covered by the settlement.26
Google will collect royalties and the Registry will hold them for right-
sholders of unclaimed works, who have ten years to come forward to
collect them before any unclaimed funds go to literary-based chari-
ties.27 The amended settlement agreement will also create an Un-
claimed Works Fiduciary (UWF), existing independent of the
Registry, to represent the interests of orphan work rightsholders. 28
On March 22, 2011, Judge Chin issued a ruling rejecting the
amended settlement agreement primarily based on the following
grounds: (1) inadequate class representation;29 (2) the settlement
agreement seeking to implement a "forward-looking business arrange-
ment" 30 which went beyond the scope of relief under Rule 23;31 (3)
the agreement raising copyright concerns by taking copyright owners'
right to exclude;32 (4) the agreement raising antitrust concerns; 33 and
(5) the agreement raising international law or foreign copyright con-
cerns. 34 Regarding antitrust concerns, which played a large part in the
Judge's decision to reject the settlement and constitute the focus of
the present paper, the Judge pointed to the possibility that the settle-
ment agreement "would give Google a de facto monopoly over un-
claimed works" and "Google's ability to deny competitors the ability
to search orphan books would further entrench Google's market
power in the online search market" in potential violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act.3 5 Strangely enough, the "Antitrust Concern" section
was only two pages long, without any discussion of whether Google's
pricing schemes would fall foul of § 1 of the Sherman Act.3 6 Further-
25. Id. §§ 1.89, 1.90, 4.5(a)(i)-(ii), 6.1(d) (indicating that Google is required to pay over sev-
enty percent of net revenues from sales and advertising to rightsholders, with a ten percent
deduction to reflect Google's operating costs, so the revenue split comes down to sixty-three
percent to rightsholders, and thirty-seven percent to Google).
26. Id. § 6.1(c).
27. Id. § 6.3(a)(i).
28. Id. H§ 3.2(e)(i), 3.3, 3.10, 4.2(c)(i), 4.3, 4.5(b)(ii), 4.7, 6.2(b)(ii).
29. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
30. Id. (quoting Statement of Interest of the U.S. Dep't of Justice at 2, No. 05-8136 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2010) (ECF No. 922)).
31. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 679-81.
32. Id. at 680-82.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 684-86.
35. Id. at 682-83 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (indicating that monop-
oly leveraging can constitute an antitrust violation under § 2 of the Sherman Act)).
36. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83.
6 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
more, the Judge did not consider whether the exclusivity restraint (i.e.
Google's monopoly over orphan works) was reasonably necessary to
further underlying efficiencies of the GBS project.37 Indeed, Judge
Chin's denial of the GBS settlement based on this antitrust concern is
not much different than condemning the exclusivity arrangement as
per se illegal monopolization under antitrust law. As will be argued in
the Part that follows, the GBS settlement, similar to the ASCAP and
BMI licensing scheme in the music industry, belongs to the general
category of copyright collective administration, a form of productive
joint venture activity, which should be accorded a rule of reason treat-
ment. The mistake in the Judge's reasoning lies in applying a per se
illegality rule instead of a rule of reason standard in evaluating "ancil-
lary restraints" to the GBS system. The following Part will also ex-
amine the proper manner in which the antitrust rule of reason should
be applied to resolve antitrust concerns arising from the GBS settle-
ment and copyright collectives of a similar type.
III. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH, COPYRIGHT COLLECTIVES, AND THE
ANTITRUST RULE OF REASON
A. The Analogy Between the GBS Settlement and ASCAPIBMI
Collective Licensing
As many commentators have noted, the GBS settlement bears in-
teresting similarities with performing rights organizations, the most
notable being ASCAP and BMI, in the music licensing industry.38
They all represent different forms of collective copyright administra-
tion, so-called copyright collectives, as a solution to the market failure
problem of high transaction costs.3 9 Commercial entities that perform
or play music in public, notable examples being shops, restaurants,
bars, discos, television and radio stations, are required under copy-
right law to seek prior consent from copyright owners in respect of
each and every performance."' Since businesses are typically inter-
ested in performing multiple and different songs, absent collective li-
censing arrangements in place, this would entail an unimaginable
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive, 2 J. LE
GAL ANALYSIS 1, 58-65 (2010); Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The
Problem of Simultaneity, 2010(4) STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2010); Yuan Ji, Why the Google
Book Search Settlement Should Be Approved: A Response to Antitrust Concerns and Suggestions
for Regulation, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 231, 239-57, 273-78 (2011).
39. Ariel Katz, Copyright Collectives: Good Solution but for Which Problem?, in WORKING
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 395-97 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et
al. ed., 2010).
40. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (4), (6) (2006).
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number of negotiations and individual licenses to be concluded be-
tween users and copyright holders.41 Collective or blanket licensing
through performing rights organizations, such as ASCAP and BMI,
came as a groundbreaking market solution. As the Supreme Court
observed in BMI,
ASCAP and the blanket license developed together out of the prac-
tical situation in the marketplace: thousands of users, thousands of
copyright owners, and millions of compositions. Most users want
unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and all of the rep-
ertory of compositions, and the owners want a reliable method of
collecting for the use of their copyrights. Individual sales transac-
tions in this industry are quite expensive, as would be individual
monitoring and enforcement[.] . .. (T]he costs are prohibitive for
licenses with individual radio stations, nightclubs, and restaurants,
and it was in that milieu that the blanket license arose. A middle-
man with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands
of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be
avoided.42
Similarly in the context of books, it would be prohibitively costly for
institutional subscribers to individually negotiate with numerous book
rightsholders for blanket licenses, and for individual consumers to get
hold of a printed or digital copy of a commercially unavailable book;
not to mention the formidable task of tracking down orphan work
rightsholders. The settlement therefore operates as a collective licens-
ing scheme established by Google and the rightsholders. It has huge
transaction-cost saving benefits in that Google acts on behalf of all
rightsholders (just as ASCAP and BMI did in respect of music per-
forming rights) in licensing digital books rights to multifarious users
on either a blanket or a per-book basis. On the other hand, the GBS
settlement leads to the creation of a new product, the institutional
subscription service that aggregates a near-universal collection of
books; this resembles the blanket licenses covering a wide range of
musical works offered by ASCAP and BMI.4 3 In fact, lowering trans-
action costs and creating a new product constituted the procompeti-
tive justifications which persuaded the Supreme Court to hold that the
ASCAP and BMI arrangement was not per se illegal under antitrust
law and should instead be tested under the "rule of reason."44 Under
41. Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective
Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 541, 571-72 (2005).
42. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979).
43. See id. at 28-29. However. ASCAP and BMI each have their own exclusive songs since
both of their agreements prohibit a rightsholder from licensing the same song through a rival
blanket licensing intermediary.
44. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 24-25.
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this test, the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the ar-
rangement shall be carefully assessed and weighed against each other
before concluding whether the agreement runs afoul of antitrust law.4 5
More specifically, the offering of a blanket music license at a lump-
sum price, similar to Google's default price and royalty terms and de
facto exclusivity over orphan works, should be viewed as ancillary re-
straints to a procompetitive joint venture-the copyright collective at
issue. As will be further elaborated below, an antitrust rule of reason
analysis would begin by asking whether such restraints have likely and
significant anticompetitive effects and, if answered affirmatively, pro-
ceed to consider whether the restraints are necessary in promoting
one of the procompetitive objectives of the collective arrangement in
question.
It is worth noting that the Second Circuit in BMI found, upon re-
mand and application of the rule of reason standard, that the ASCAP
and BMI arrangement lacked anticompetitive effects because of non-
exclusivity: (1) individual song users remained free to seek direct li-
censes from the rightsholders; and (2) the fact that users might prefer
the blanket license over individual negotiation was irrelevant. 46 Simi-
larly, the GBS settlement does not bar purchases of books directly
from rightsholders or other intermediaries such as Amazon, eBay, or
physical bookstores, since every right Google has to digitize, display,
or sell books under the settlement agreement is expressly non-exclu-
sive.47 It can be argued, though, that Google has de facto exclusivity
over the offering of orphan works (in any event-as will be examined
below-this concern should be evaluated under the rule of reason in-
stead of relied on as a per se ground for rejecting the settlement). 4 8 In
fact, as Professor Elhauge observed, there are several differences be-
tween the GBS settlement and the ASCAP and BMI arrangement
which render the former less restrictive and hence less likely to consti-
tute a rule of reason violation.49 First, ASCAP and BMI only offered
blanket licenses but not individual songs; whereas Google is offering
books both as part of its institutional subscription and on a standalone
45. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); CBS, Inc. v. Am.
Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980); Clorox Co. v.
Sterling Winthrop Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENS-
ING OF IP § 3.4 (U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n) (1995), http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter IP LICENSING GUIDELINES].
46. CBS, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 935-39 (2d
Cir. 1980).
47. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, §§ 2.4, 3.1(a).
48. See infra Part IV(A).
49. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 7.
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basis, and hence provides consumers a choice that the plaintiff sought
as a remedy in BMI.5 0 Secondly, while only ASCAP and BMI had the
right to price the blanket license, the GBS settlement permits right-
sholders to set their own prices for books sold through Google (or ask
Google to set prices based on the Pricing Algorithm).5' Thirdly, al-
though music rightsholders have the right to license directly to end
users, they are prohibited under their ASCAP or BMI agreement
from licensing the same song through a rival intermediary; in contrast,
the GBS settlement allows book rightsholders not only to license di-
rectly, but also simultaneously distribute their books through Google
and/or another intermediary.52 Fourthly, the procompetitiveness of
the GBS settlement lies not only in grouping copyrights in one inter-
mediary (as was the case of ASCAP and BMI), but also clarifying
rights and digitizing books to make it easier for users to identify the
materials they need.53 Finally, the requirements of competitive re-
turns and broad access in the pricing of institutional subscription and
consumer purchases provide a more reliable and objective benchmark
than the reasonable-fee test for the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees
in ensuring that prices remain competitive. 54 We shall later examine
the restraints relating to pricing and orphan work exclusivity more
closely to determine their legality under an antitrust rule of reason.55
There is also one subtle difference between the GBS arrange-
ment-which arises from a class action settlement requiring ex ante
court approval 56-and the blanket license agreement in BMI which
(despite already subject to antitrust consent decrees) was challenged
ex post as a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.5 7 When deciding
whether to condemn a horizontal agreement or joint venture under
the rule of reason, an antitrust court will weigh its anticompetitive ef-
fects against its procompetitive effects in deciding whether the ar-
rangement is overall efficiency-enhancing or -reducing, and will
possibly look into whether there is a less restrictive alternative that is
capable of achieving the same procompetitive objectives.58 In con-
trast, when a court decides whether or not to approve a class action
settlement under Rule 23(e), it is only bound by an open-ended stan-
50. Id. at 7, 60.
51. Id. at 7, 61-62.
52. Id. at 7, 62-63.
53. Id. at 59-60.
54. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 62.
55. See infra Parts IV(A)-(B).
56. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y 2011).
57. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 6 (1979).
58. See infra Part III(B).
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dard of ensuring that the settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable,
and not a product of collusion."5 9 Over time, the courts have devel-
oped more concrete sets of considerations (for example, the Grinnell
factors60) in determining whether a settlement agreement is "fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable," but which factors are more important in any
particular case still turns on the facts and circumstances of each case
and the experience of judges.61 In any event, courts will almost inevi-
tably look at whether the settlement raises illegality concerns in differ-
ent areas of law-as Judge Chin did in the GBS Judgment under the
headings of "Copyright Concerns,"62 "Antitrust Concerns,"63 "Privacy
Concerns," 64 and "International Law Concerns." 65 As mentioned
above, he raised the antitrust concern that the settlement agreement
would give Google de facto exclusivity over orphan works and
thereby extend its monopoly in the online search market (though anti-
trust issues arising from Google's pricing schemes were not discussed
anywhere in the judgment). 66 What the Judge should have done re-
garding the exclusivity restraint (as with the pricing restraint that he
should have discussed) is to subject it to a rule of reason analysis and
evaluate whether its likely anticompetitive effects outweighed its
procompetitive justifications. Indeed, the difference between ex ante
approval of a class action settlement and ex post antitrust intervention
of horizontal agreement may not be as significant as it first seems.
First, although obvious and actual anticompetitive effects may serve as
a substitute for formal market analysis,67 evidence of increasing prices
and declining output alone is often inconclusive of cartel or monopoli-
zation effects. This is why market definition and analysis is frequently
used as a surrogate for determining whether an agreement or conduct
has likely and significant anticompetitive effects. 68 Secondly, antitrust
agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)) have actually developed voluntary procedures for
ex ante assessment of non-merger activity, as the agencies used busi-
ness review letters extensively in the context of patent pools and stan-
dard-setting organizations, an area closely related to copyright
59. Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
60. See Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 674 (indicating the nine factors).
61. Id. at 674.
62. Id. at 680.
63. Id. at 673.
64. Id. at 673-74.
65. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
66. Id. at 682-83.
67. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).
68. PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1503(a) (3d ed. 2006).
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collectives.69 Such letters state an agency's intention not to challenge
business practices contemplated by the organization as of the date of
the letter, though the agency may refuse to be bound by its letter.70 In
sum, irrespective of whether a copyright-related horizontal arrange-
ment or settlement agreement is tested under the antitrust rule of rea-
son, a court should carefully assess market circumstances to ascertain
its likely anticompetitive effects and weigh them against the claimed
efficiencies of the agreement.
B. The Proper Antitrust Baseline and Rule of Reason Standard
A natural question arises: precisely how should a court apply the
antitrust rule of reason? Specifically, how should it "weigh" anticom-
petitive effects of a horizontal agreement against procompetitive justi-
fications when any quantitative cost-benefit analysis would be
practically unachievable? The answer to this question turns on the
proper antitrust baseline for qualitatively assessing the anticompeti-
tive and procompetitive effects of an agreement. This has in fact been
the subject of rigorous debate between Professors Einer Elhauge and
Randal Picker in their articles concerning the GBS settlement.7' Pro-
fessor Elhauge prefers to look at whether or not an agreement is over-
all output-increasing or efficiency-enhancing; if the answer is positive,
it should be regarded as procompetitive and the antitrust inquiry is
over.72 He therefore argues that "[a]ny claimed anticompetitive ef-
fects must be measured from the but-for baseline of what would hap-
pen without the settlement,"73 which means "there would . . . be no
market in unclaimed or commercially unavailable books, and thus no
firm offering them or a near-universal library." 74 In Elhauge's view,
society would be better off even with Google charging monopoly
prices for commercially unavailable books and its institutional sub-
scriptions and no rival being able to overcome entry barriers to offer
digital books in a similar manner, as having a monopolistically-priced
new product is always better than no product at all.75 In sum, a rule of
reason analysis under antitrust law should determine "whether the
settlement improves consumer welfare from the but-for world, not
69. Katz, supra note 39, at 424, n.99.
70. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcy: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 593 (3d ed. 2005).
71. See Elhauge, supra note 38, at 15-27; Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Franing
Baselines in the Google Book Search Settlement, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. Oct. 2009.
72. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 2.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 17, 19.
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whether it maximizes consumer welfare to the fullest extent
conceivable." 76
In contrast, Professor Picker argues that it is wrong to solely focus
on output expansion resulting from the creation of a new product.77
In deciding whether to use antitrust to block price-fixing of a new
product, "[tihe relevant comparison isn't the before- and after- worlds
as to the cartel but rather the worlds with and without the antitrust
remedy."78 In particular, antitrust intervention is appropriate if it is
expected to direct the innovation towards a competitively priced new
product as opposed to outright abandonment of the innovative pro-
ject.79 As he further observes:
If price-fixing in the new market was the only way to bring it into
being, antitrust authorities should accept the price-fixing as the nec-
essary price of creating the innovation in the first place. But this
requires actual judgments: Fully-competitive [new products] would
be a better outcome if we can get there and sidestep killing off the
innovation.80
In other words, only if price-fixing or other ancillary restraints are
marginal for the sustainability of the new product venture will society
be better off by permitting the horizontal agreement under a rule of
reason analysis. Therefore, the key issue in the GBS case would be
whether there are separable anticompetitive features of the overall
procompetitive settlement that should be removed pursuant to the an-
titrust laws.
Interestingly, the two distinct antitrust baselines advocated by
Elhauge and Picker are reflected in the evolving antitrust jurispru-
dence on the proper approach of applying the rule of reason analysis.
Professor Elhauge's approach, which focuses on the overall competi-
tive effects of an agreement, is representative of the traditional rule of
reason standard that the courts have applied for most of the previous
century. In Chicago Board of Trade,81 one of earliest Supreme Court
decisions applying the rule of reason, Justice Brandeis observed that
"[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed . . . pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even de-
stroy competition." 8 2 The Court's emphasis on net efficiency effects
76. Id. at 20.
77. Picker, supra note 71, at 3.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
82. Id. at 238.
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has largely continued through to the BMI case in the late 1970s, where
the Second Circuit, on remand, held,
A rule of reason analysis requires a determination of whether an
agreement is on balance an unreasonable restraint of trade, that is,
whether its anti-competitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive ef-
fects . . . . In this case, however, . . . the balancing of pro- and anti-
com-petitive effects need not be undertaken because Judge Lasker's
findings of fact demonstrate that the blanket license has no an-
ticompetitive effect at all.83
More precisely, the blanket license lacks anticompetitiveness because
of its non-exclusive nature, rendering it unnecessary for the court to
proceed to the balancing stage where the procompetitive justifications
of transaction-cost savings and new product creation become relevant.
Over time, however, the courts have developed a more nuanced ap-
proach of applying the rule of reason analysis, which reflects Professor
Picker's rationale of unbundling anticompetitive effects from an over-
all procompetitive transaction. 84 This so-called "less restrictive alter-
native" (LRA) inquiry asks whether a particular restraint is
reasonably necessary in promoting a procompetitive objective of the
agreement, or more specifically, whether there exists an LRA which is
just as or even more effective in achieving the claimed efficiencies. 85
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,86 a Supreme Court decision which
shortly followed BMI, the Court applied the LRA analysis and con-
cluded that the NCAA's procompetitive justifications were merely
pretext and the real purpose of the NCAA's plan for televising college
football games was to restrict output and raise prices.87 Although the
Court agreed that the television plan had procompetitive objectives of
maintaining competitive balance between the teams and preserving
the amateur nature of college football as a unique product,88 it pro-
ceeded to identify alternative rules and restraints which were just as
effective in achieving the claimed benefits.89 The maintenance of
competitive balance, restrictions on recruiting, number of coaches and
players per team, alumni donations, and other revenue resources were
83. CBS, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.
1980).
84. Picker, supra note 71.
85. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, §§ 1505, 1913; Gabriel A. Feldman, The
Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
561, 577-86 (2009).
86. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
87. Id. at 120.
88. Id. at 102.
89. Id. at 119.
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considered as equally effective restraints. 90 With regard to preserving
the nature of college football, the NCAA could have employed the
LRAs of limiting payment to players and prescribing eligibility re-
quirements.91 The Court therefore found NCAA's television plan to
be an illegal agreement under a § 1 rule of reason analysis. 92 Later in
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc.,93 a case concerning the antitrust
legality of Lysol trademark agreements, the Second Circuit formalized
the LRA approach in the form of a three-part-analytical framework:
First, the "'plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as
a whole in the relevant market. . . . ' Then, "if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the 'pro-com-
petitive "redeeming virtues"' of the action. Should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then show the same pro-com-
petitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means that
is less restrictive of competition." 94
The general framework set out in the "Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property" 95 (jOintly issued by the DOJ and
FTC) adopts largely the same approach but provides additional in-
sights on how the LRA analysis should be conducted. Regarding the
analysis of anticompetitive effects (i.e. the first part of the Clorox
test), the Guidelines emphasized the importance of distinguishing be-
tween horizontal and vertical restraints in an intellectual property (IP)
licensing agreement. 96 For horizontal agreements, the anticompetitive
concern lies in the facilitation of coordinated pricing, monopolization,
or restriction of technological development.97 The concern for verti-
cal restraints is that they may foreclose access to important inputs or
facilitate horizontal coordination at the market level of either the li-
censor or licensee.98 Whether anticompetitive effects are significant
and likely will depend on various factors, including degree of concen-
tration, difficulty of entry, supply and demand elasticity, and duration
of the restraint. 99 Only if a restraint is likely to have anticompetitive
effects will the antitrust agencies proceed to "consider whether the
90. Id.
91. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119.
92. Id. at 117-20.
93. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 56 (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991))).
95. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 45.
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restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive efficien-
cies," at which point it is relevant to consider "the existence of practi-
cal and significantly less restrictive alternatives[.]"too Even if a
restraint is reasonably necessary in that there is no identifiable LRA,
the agencies are still required to "balance the procompetitive efficien-
cies and the anticompetitive effects to determine the probable net ef-
fect on competition in each relevant market."10
There is still some legal uncertainty as to whether "less restrictive"
entails that the alternative achieves a greater level, the same level, or
nearly the same level of procompetitive efficiencies with a lesser an-
ticompetitive impact.102 What is certain, however, is that courts and
agencies are not requiring antitrust defendants to adopt the least re-
strictive alternative that may substantially interfere with procompeti-
tive objectives without adding much to competition at the margin.103
Nor are courts expected to engage in a marginal analysis weighing the
incremental efficiencies of the restraint (vis-d-vis the next best alterna-
tive) against incremental social costs in terms of higher prices and
lower output. A marginal cost-benefit analysis may well be the theo-
retically ideal way of resolving conflicts at the antitrust and IP inter-
section, but as Professor Kaplow noted, courts simply lack sufficient
information to calculate an incremental welfare to loss ratio for every
licensing restraint, let alone compare such a ratio to the welfare to loss
ratio for the last year of optimal IP duration (which is itself impossible
to determine).104 Kaplow advocated in his seminal antitrust and pat-
ent article a qualitative application of the marginal analysis by having
antitrust courts consider three factors in determining whether to con-
demn or approve a patentee practice: (1) the extent to which the pat-
entee reward is pure transfer; 05 (2) the portion of the reward accruing
to the patentee;106 and (3) the degree to which the reward serves as an
incentive.107 However, it is doubtful whether these factors are appli-
100. IP LICENSING GUIDELINEs, supra note 45, § 4.2.
101. Id.
102. See Feldman, supra note 85, at 604-05.
103. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 1505(a).
104. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV 1813,
1833-34 (1984).
105. Id. at 1835 (stating for example, discriminatory royalties resulting in a transfer of welfare
from licensees to licensors without much deadweight loss, thus having a high ratio).
106. Id. at 1835-37 (stating for example, where a licensing agreement is a disguised cartel or is
granted by an assignee of a patent, most of the reward is accrued to someone other than the
original patentee who has little incentive to innovate, resulting in a low ratio).
107. Id. at 1837-39 (indicating that unless an ex post reward can be reasonably estimated ex
ante because, for instance, the patentee is an experienced inventor and appreciates the value of
restrictive licensing practices, the reward is unlikely to have substantial effect on inventive
activity).
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cable beyond the context of IP licensing. It is also difficult to genera-
lize factors to be considered in a marginal analysis of other antitrust
and IP issues such as copyright collectives and IP-related settlement
agreements. Such an undertaking would require a large sample of en-
forcement practices and court decisions from antitrust authorities. 08
Returning to the fundamental question posed at the beginning of
this Part: which type of the rule of reason analysis should be pre-
ferred-the Elhauge overall-efficiency approach or the Picker LRA
analysis? It is worth noting that the LRA analysis is a "maximizing"
test, which selects "the most efficient method for accomplishing the
procompetitive benefits of a restraint."109 While the overall-efficiency
approach is a "satisficing" test, which only ensures that an agreement
is satisfactorily or sufficiently efficiency-enhancing, in that "the mar-
ket is better off with the restraint than without it."110 All things being
equal, it is obvious that a maximizing inquiry is preferred to a satisfic-
ing one; there is therefore no reason to favor the overall-efficiency
approach over the LRA analysis unless the latter is somehow practi-
cally unachievable.
Indeed, critics of the LRA analysis have noted its potential adverse
effects of increasing decision-error costs and chilling procompetitive
behavior."' However, these negative effects can be effectively miti-
gated such that applying a properly structured LRA analysis will be
more social-welfare-enhancing than a crude overall-efficiency ap-
proach. If the concern about false negatives is due to judges' lack of
expertise in understanding industrial market structures and behav-
ior,112 the courts can seek guidance from a judicially-appointed eco-
nomic expert and the antitrust agency (the DOJ or the FTC) which
specializes in enforcement in the industry concerned. Besides, the an-
titrust courts are not expected to engage in an open-ended "search for
a theoretically least restrictive alternative";' 1 3 instead, courts are
asked to realistically consider the merits of LRA claims by an antitrust
plaintiff (who bears the burden of proving an LRA) against "the prac-
tical prospective business situation faced by the parties."114
108. See Kelvin Kwok, A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property
Rights Disputes, 34 WORLD COMPETITION L. & EcON. REV. 261 (2011) (indicating an attempt to
generalize factors to consider in the qualitative balancing of allocative efficiency losses and qual-
itative efficiency gains due to a monopolist refusing to license intellectual property rights).
109. Feldman, supra note 85, at 589.
110. Id. at 590.
111. See, e.g., id. at 599-610.
112. See, e.g., Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
113. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 45, § 4.2.
114. Id. § 4.2.
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A more legitimate concern is that the LRA analysis may result in
over-deterrence of procompetitive conduct due to ex ante uncertainty
and opaqueness of the legal standard.115 This can be partially miti-
gated by conducting the LRA inquiry from an ex ante rather than ex
post basis. In the GBS context, this entails asking whether Google
would still be willing to move forward with the GBS project if particu-
lar restraints (e.g. orphan work exclusivity, pricing and royalty terms)
were removed or substituted with an LRA at the point in time when no
investment has yet been made, rather than the time of the court's deci-
sion-making when Google has already incurred huge sunk costs in the
project and will still find it profitable to continue with it even with the
court's antitrust intervention. The purpose of adopting an ex ante
perspective is to ensure that Google, or similarly situated competitors,
will not in the long run abandon innovative but risky research and
development activities which overall enhance social welfare on the ac-
count of the courts' previous LRA interventions. On the other hand,
although irrelevant to approval of class action settlements as in the
present case, chilling of beneficial conduct may be attributable to the
prospect of treble damages in antitrust court cases, which automati-
cally follows from an antitrust plaintiff successfully establishing an
LRA.116 A possible solution to this problem is to introduce a legisla-
tive exception for mandatory trebling specifically for copyright collec-
tives (or more generally for co-operative joint ventures involved in the
development and commercialization of IP rights). Congress has taken
this approach to protect the interests of standard-setting organiza-
tions: it passed in 2004 the Standard Development Organization Ad-
vancement Act which created antitrust exceptions to qualifying
standards groups, including a limitation to single damages liability,
guaranteed rule of reason treatment, and a safe harbor for organiza-
tions with members holding less than twenty percent collective market
share. 117 Nevertheless, it may be felt that any amount of damages re-
sulting from a LRA inquiry would create sufficient ex ante uncer-
tainty and risk to deter net procompetitive conduct; but if damages
were to be completely eliminated, it would be doubtful whether pri-
vate parties will still have an incentive to bring antitrust suits at all.
An alternative solution to this damages dilemma is therefore to elimi-
nate private suits altogether and to permit only government agencies
(i.e. DOJ or FTC) to initiate equity proceedings seeking to implement
115. Feldman, supra note 85, at 609-10.
116. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
117. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (2006).
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the LRA as part of a court or agency order without any criminal sanc-
tions or civil penalties attached. 118
Since varying the antitrust remedy and taking an ex ante perspec-
tive should be effective measures against the threat of deterring
procompetitive behavior, there seems to be reason to favor the maxi-
mizing LRA inquiry over the satisficing overall efficiency test as the
normative antitrust standard for evaluating copyright collectives
under the antirust rule of reason. The following Part will present a
general, step-by-step framework that courts should follow in evaluat-
ing antitrust concerns of copyright collectives under the LRA rule of
reason analysis. It is applicable in both a court case in which the legal-
ity of ancillary restraints is challenged ex post under the relevant anti-
trust statues and also the unique situation of the GBS dispute where a
court comes to decide ex ante whether to approve a class action settle-
ment agreement having antitrust implications.
C. Application of the Rule of Reason to the GBS Settlement and
Copyright Collectives: An Analytical Framework
An antitrust analysis should begin by asking whether the restraint at
issue is ancillary to the copyright collective, in that it is "expected to
contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activ-
ity."119 The collective licensing arrangement can lead to efficiencies in
both the productive sense (e.g., savings in transaction costs) and the
qualitative dimension (e.g., creation of a new product, often blanket
licensing arrangements). Ancillary restraints should be accorded a
rule of reason treatment, meaning courts should not immediately con-
demn the restraint under the antitrust statues or reject a class action
settlement upon finding an anticompetitive restraint. In other words,
courts should reserve per se illegality only for plainly anticompetitive
restraints such as naked price-fixing, output restriction, or market di-
vision among parties (in either a horizontal or vertical relationship)
who are not collaborating in any procompetitive joint venture activ-
ity.120 This was definitely not the case for music licensing by BMI and
ASCAP121 or digital books distribution by Google in the GBS settle-
118. See Kelvin H. Kwok, A Proposal to Resolving Conflicts at the Intersection of Antitrust
Law and Securities Regulation (unpublished working paper) (on file with author) (indicating a
similar suggestion in the context of antitrust and securities conflicts).
119. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 45, § 3.4.
120. Id. § 3.4.
121. See generally Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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ment,122 so the restraints in both instances should be tested under the
rule of reason.
A rule of reason treatment of ancillary restraints should commence
with an antitrust plaintiff (or amicus curiae opposing a class action
settlement) demonstrating that a restraint has likely and significant
anticompetitive effects. It is important to present an anticompetitive
theory in order to identify evidence necessary for courts to judge
probabilities and magnitudes. 123 This feeds into the examination of
market circumstances surrounding the copyright collective in ques-
tion, which forms the fulcrum of the anticompetitive inquiry. Al-
though the precise market conditions to focus on vary from one type
of restraint to another, it is possible to generalize several factors that
are generally applicable in most cases. For example, how much mar-
ket power does the restraint confer? How concentrated in the rele-
vant market? Is entry difficult? How about the behavior and shares
of existing rivals? 124 How elastic is supply and demand in the relevant
markets? Does the restraint tend to restrict or expand output? Is
there direct evidence of anticompetitive effects in terms of higher
prices or lower output?
If anticompetitive effects are established, the burden is shifted to
the antitrust defendant (or the settlement parties-Google and the
book rightsholders in the GBS case) to demonstrate that the restraint
is reasonably necessary for a procompetitive objective, which is part
and parcel of the copyright collective. The defendant or settlement
parties will establish a prima facie case of necessity by pointing out the
procompetitive purpose of the challenged restraint and showing eco-
nomically how this could lead to redeeming efficiencies. This is the
point at which the LRA analysis enters the picture. It falls to the anti-
trust plaintiff (or opposing party to a settlement) to show that there is
a practical LRA that could have achieved (or can likely achieve) the
same level (or nearly the same degree) of claimed efficiencies with
less competitive harm. The court should carefully consider the LRA
against the "practical prospective business situation faced by the par-
ties" 125 and obtain guidance from a judicially appointed economic ex-
pert or amicus curiae who has informed knowledge of actual market
conditions. To preserve innovation incentives and hence long-term
qualitative efficiency, the courts should conduct the LRA inquiry from
an ex ante perspective, asking whether the joint venture parties (here,
122. See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
123. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 1503(a).
124. Id. § 1503(b).
125. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 45, § 4.2.
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Google and the rightsholders) would still have commenced the inno-
vative project, assuming the absence of any form of sunk investment,
had the restraint been substituted with the plausible LRA. If a practi-
cal ex ante LRA can be identified, the court should issue an injunction
or consent decree implementing that LRA in the case of an antitrust
action, or rejecting the proposed class settlement but recommending
that the parties amend their agreement to reflect the LRA for a likely
future approval. As is suggested above, Congress should introduce a
legislative exception to waive mandatory trebling of antitrust damages
in the context of copyright collectives, or to go further by allowing
only the government (not private parties) to bring an equity suit to
enjoin the restraint in question and have it substituted with a practical
LRA.
If substituting anticompetitive restraints with LRAs which are
equally effective in attaining certain procompetitive objectives works
in favor of economic efficiency, in a similar logic, adding procompeti-
tive features to the collective licensing arrangement should make the
copyright joint venture even more procompetitive and hence be en-
couraged. A "procompetitive" feature is one that is overall efficiency-
enhancing: it results in productive or qualitative efficiency (for in-
stance, further transaction cost savings or additional product offer-
ings), which is likely to outweigh any potential negative impact on
allocative efficiency. It is true that courts do not have the authority to
mandate parties to implement add-on features to make their transac-
tion more procompetitive (and it would be going too far to enact legis-
lation conferring on courts such a power), but there is nothing to
prevent courts from affirmatively recommending certain pro-competi-
tive modifications that the parties should consider in its judgment
(whether resulting from antitrust litigation or class action settlement
approval). It may be unrealistic to expect the courts to expend much
energy "brainstorming" and designing possible procompetitive modi-
fications for the parties' (and society's) benefit; but the parties them-
selves surely have the incentive to undertake this form of "reversed"
rule of reason analysis to figure out whether certain procompetitive
features can be added to the copyright collective (which enhances pro-
ducer surplus), and whether courts are likely to uphold these modifi-
cations should they later be challenged in an antitrust action (which
depends on whether the modifications are social-welfare-enhancing as
well). Besides, a business letter review program can be set up to en-
able copyright collective members to benefit from ex ante screening of
proposed modifications by antitrust agencies before their actual
implementation.
[Vol. 10:1
RULE OF REASON AND THE GBS SETTLEMEN-r
The remainder of this paper is devoted to an in depth rule of reason
analysis of two central anticompetitive concerns in the GBS settle-
ment. First is Google's de facto exclusivity over orphan works and its
pricing mechanisms for consumer purchases and institutional subscrip-
tion, which largely follows the framework proposed above. Second, it
also demonstrates how the "reverse" rule of reason can be applied to
analyze the desirability or procompetitiveness of certain modifications
proposed by Google or commentators which are yet to be imple-
mented as part of the GBS settlement.
IV. A RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS OF THE GBS SETTLEMENT
A. De Facto Exclusivity over Orphan Works
First, it important to note that Google does not have legal exclusiv-
ity over any kind of work-commercially available, commercially un-
available, or orphan works. Commercially available books are by
default excluded from the GBS system under the amended settlement
agreement.126 As for commercially unavailable books under active
ownership, their rightsholders can always opt out of class action or
come forward at a later time to request that their books be ex-
cluded.127 Book rightsholders are free to license their book rights to
any company-not only Google but also its competitors. Why, then,
is the settlement so controversial? A common concern among com-
mentators is that Google will have de facto exclusivity over orphan
works under the settlement. 128 Although there is an apparent right to
opt out of the class action or to claim one's book at a later stage,
orphan work rightsholders, by definition, have not opted or come for-
ward and their whereabouts simply cannot be traced. So although
Google seems to have nonexclusive rights to display and sell orphan
works, these rights may, in reality, turn out to be exclusive in nature.
But what about Google's competitors, can they not enter the mar-
ket to compete with Google in offering book searches and distribu-
tion? There are two methods of competitive entry in theory. First, a
new entrant can contact the rightsholders individually (or use the Au-
thors Guild of America and the Association of American Publishers
as contact points) and reach an agreement in respect of each book.
126. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 3.2.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, How to Improve the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 10-20 (2009); Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New
Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 383, 386 (2009); Pamela Samuelson,
Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1308, 1335-36
(2010).
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This method entails high transaction costs (e.g. ascertaining the books
in copyright, identifying their rightsholders, and negotiating license
agreements with them); and it is impossible to obtain licenses for or-
phan works. Secondly, a new entrant can imitate the actions of
Google: scan millions of books without permission, wait for a class
action by the rightsholders, and either litigate the case (and argue fair
use) or attempt to strike a settlement deal with the rightsholders. This
method has the downside of high litigation costs and risk-bearing costs
(note that statutory damages for willful copyright infringement can
reach $150,000 per book, 129 not to mention the severe criminal penal-
ties).130 As Google's competitors may lack the ability, money, or will-
ingness to undertake either of the two routes, Google may well end up
being the sole proprietor of orphan works.
Nevertheless, one should notice that when Google decided to enter
the digital book market a few years ago, it faced many of the same
options. Both avenues were equally costly, if not more, for Google.
The Internet company decided not to go down the route of obtaining
permission, which probably would have taken a preclusive amount of
time before every book was digitized. Instead, it elected to digitize
books on a vast scale, risking catastrophic damages should right-
sholders bring a successful action for copyright infringement. This
risk, in this respect, emanated from the legal uncertainty surrounding
the applicability of copyright law's fair use defense. It was in no way
certain then, as it is now, that rightsholders would agree to a settle-
ment and grant Google the permission to distribute books on their
behalf (and as a side effect, orphan works as well). Therefore, as
some commentators have argued, courts should not punish Google for
its entrepreneurship provided that it does not seek to raise rivals'
costs, either directly or indirectly through reaching the class settle-
ment agreement. 131 Specifically, the key question is whether the class
settlement has the effect of erecting artificial entry barriers that would
bar potential entry, as distinct from the question whether entry is diffi-
cult because natural entry barriers have no causal link with settlement
itself.132
The settlement parties voluntarily removed one example of an arti-
ficial entry barrier, the most-favored-nation (MEN) clause in the origi-
129. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
130. Id. § 506.
131. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 38, at 16.
132. Id.
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nal settlement agreement. 133 The MFN clause required that if the
Registry licensed a significant portion of unclaimed works to a third
party intermediary within ten years of the settlement's effective date,
it had to offer Google the same or better terms as the third party is
entitled to.1 3 4 MFN clauses have the effect of discouraging entry, and
hence future competition, in the market. First, any benefit that a li-
censor grants to a subsequent licensee will have to accrue to the first
actor (here Google) also, which means doubling the cost of granting
subsequent licenses. Secondly, the second actor will find it difficult to
gain competitive advantage over the first one since they will always be
entitled to the same licensing terms.135 It is important to note, how-
ever, that courts generally consider MFN clauses legal under antitrust
laws. 136 As the Seventh Circuit observed in Marshfield Clinic,
"[MFN] clauses are standard devices by which buyers try to bargain
for low prices, by getting the seller to agree to treat them as favorably
as any of their other customers . . . [which] is the sort of conduct that
antitrust laws seek to encourage."137 It is indeed possible that remov-
ing the MIEFN clause will discourage Google from reaching a settle-
ment with the rightsholders (this turned out not to be the case ex post
as the MFN clause was eventually removed from the settlement agree-
ment) or even undertaking the GBS project in the first place.
Whether such a clause should be retained or removed under a rule-of-
reason analysis will turn on the court's judgment as to whether it is a
necessary ancillary restraint to the GBS scheme from an ex ante per-
spective. In any event, the issue is less important now given that
Google has already agreed to eliminate the MFN clause from the set-
tlement agreement.
Let us now revisit the two routes of entry and evaluate whether the
GBS settlement has raised the cost of entry for each. Regarding the
first option-obtaining licensing and permission to digitize-one
might argue that the settlement gives Google an advantage over its
competitors in obtaining "permission" to exploit orphan works. Li-
censing costs are basically zero for Google to exploit any of these un-
claimed works pursuant to the settlement agreement, and infinity for a
new entrant that does not wish to break the law by offering orphan
133. Settlement Agreement § 3.8(a), Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-8136, 2009
WL 5576331 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-
resources.attachment/settlement/settlement%20Agreement.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Picker, supra note 128, at 401.
136. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1415 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Delta Dental of R.I, 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996).
137. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1415.
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works without permission. So in relative terms, Google's potential ri-
val will be facing higher costs than Google in respect of the licensing
of orphan works. However, this is only true in the ex post sense.
From an ex ante perspective, comparing the licensing options availa-
ble to Google before its entry and to its competitors in light of the GBS
settlement, Google and its competitors are in fact facing the same im-
possibility of offering orphan works if they insist on obtaining consent
beforehand. Therefore, the settlement agreement does not raise entry
costs for Google's competitors insofar as the licensing and permission
route of entry is concerned.
With regard to the second entry mode-copyright litigation and set-
tlement-the relevant question is whether the GBS settlement makes
it more difficult for a subsequent intermediary to strike a separate
settlement deal with the rightsholders. Some commentators have ar-
gued that, despite the removal of the MFN clause, rightsholders still
face disincentives to offer licenses (over orphan works and other
books) to a new entrant. Specifically, Professor Picker has argued,
If we think that the collection of rights represented in the lawsuit
really is unique, then we should not think that the Authors Guild
would wish to license them to a second online search provider. The
rights represent a monopoly and licensing use to two or more prov-
iders will result in competition between those providers and will al-
most certainly make the returns to the rights provider much
lower. 138
This observation seems incorrect. While competition on the selling
side would push prices down, competition on the buying side would
actually push prices up. In the context of the GBS settlement, it
would mean that the sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent roy-
alty split would possibly be adjusted to a higher ratio in light of com-
petition between Google and the new entrant for a rightsholder's
license. The Supreme Court correctly observed in Leegin that "[t]he
difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the
price retailers charge consumers represents part of the manufacturer's
cost of distribution, which ... the manufacturer usually desires to min-
imize." 139 One way to reduce the distribution makeup is precisely to
introduce more retailers at the wholesale level. In the present case, it
would mean having the rightsholders license their rights to another
book intermediary, which is rational and to their benefit. It is true
that Google and this new intermediary may compete with each other
(as sellers) by offering discounts off the "List Price" set by each right-
138. Picker, supra note 128, at 403.
139. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896 (2007).
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sholder (note: this list price actually represents a maximum retail
price: see the analysis in the next Part); but since both intermediaries
are offering these discounts at their own costs (i.e. the sixty-three per-
cent to thirty-seven percent royalty split is applied to the List Price by
default, not the final retail price),140 such retail price competition does
not harm the rightsholders at all. If anything, it actually benefits indi-
vidual rightsholders because a lower retail price translates into higher
sales volume and in turn higher revenue for rightsholders (which is
volume times sixty-seven percent of the list price, unaffected by the
offering of discounts by intermediaries). The above analysis suggests
that an argument based on the unwillingness of rightsholders to li-
cense another intermediary is untenable. One exception is perhaps a
situation where rightsholders are colluding to exercise market power
through Google to set monopoly retail prices for their books and split-
ting monopoly profits among themselves. But the next Part will
demonstrate that the Pricing Algorithm adopted in the amended set-
tlement agreement does not allow Google to set monopoly prices on
behalf of rightsholders collectively to facilitate a book cartel; nor do
industry conditions in a differentiated book market suggest that any
form of collusion between rightsholders would be sustainable.
Despite the dismissal of the disincentives to license argument, there
remains concern that, if a new entrant comes along and triggers an-
other class settlement agreement, it will face stronger opposition (vis-
d-vis the first settlement) on the grounds of collusiveness or abuse of
the judicial process which will result in its failure to satisfy the test of
"fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion" for
the purposes of judicial approval under Rule 23(e). 14 1 As Professor
Grimmelmann observed:
The Authors Guild lawsuit was genuinely adversarial when filed, the
parties did significant pretrial work, and litigation remains a real
possibility if the settlement falls through. But since a structured ...
settlement [initiated by another entrant] would be the goal ab initio,
it would be difficult to negotiate one without calling into question
the adequacy of the class representation or the existence of an Arti-
cle III case or controversy. Unless [the second] settlement differed
from Google's in some material points, it might be hard to say it was
actually negotiated at arms' length.142
Nor is it practicable for the new intermediary to rely on trial and the
fair use defense as a fallback in the event that settlement fails. Since
140. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.5(b)(i).
141. Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000).
142. James Grimmelmann, The Amended Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive, 1 CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. Jan. 2010, at 5.
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there is a clear intention on the entrant's part to deliberately infringe
copyright in the hope of an eventual settlement, the courts will likely
impute a "bad element" into the entrant's infringement, which weighs
against a finding of fair usel 43 and enhances the likelihood of finding
willful infringement, and consequently enhanced statutory
damages.144
It is therefore likely that a new entrant cannot simply follow
Google's footsteps, without at least incurring higher costs, by trigger-
ing a class action and hoping for a class action settlement. The fact
that rivals face higher entry costs provides justification for altering the
Settlement Agreement to facilitate entry and prevent Google from ac-
quiring a de facto monopoly over orphan works. One way to achieve
this is to confer power on either the Registry or the UWF to grant a
collective license over orphan works to any intermediary that wishes
to enter the book digitization market. At present, neither the Regis-
try nor the UWF has this power. There has been some confusion
among commentators as to the effect of § 6.2(b)(i) of the Settlement
Agreement, which authorizes "the Registry,... to the extent permit-
ted by law, [to] license Rightsholders' U.S. copyrights to third parties
(in the case of unclaimed Books and Inserts, the [UWF] may license
to third parties . . . to the extent permitted by law)."145 This clause is
best understood as a description of what the Registry or UWF is per-
mitted to do under the current law; it is not a power-conferring provi-
sion which authorizes the Registry or UWF to transfer a copyright
license on behalf of a rightsholder.146
Having the Registry or the UWF act as a clearinghouse for all will-
ing entrants can be seen as an LRA to the present settlement under
which Google will likely have de facto exclusivity over orphan works.
It is "less restrictive" because such a scheme would greatly reduce ri-
vals' costs and facilitate their entry into the book digitization market
to compete with Google in offering orphan works and other books. It
would also reduce deadweight loss because enhanced competition at
the retail level (between Google and the new entrant) will bring down
retail prices and induce greater demand for books. But is such an
improvement to allocative efficiency purchased at a cost to productive
efficiency or qualitative efficiency in the long run? One could imagine
143. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see also Time, Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
144. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
145. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 6.2(b)(i).
146. Grimmelmann, supra note 142, at 3; Picker, supra note 128, at 402; cf. Elhauge, supra
note 38, at 12-13.
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a productive efficiency argument being made based on the natural
monopoly characteristics of the digital book market. The natural mo-
nopoly describes a market characterized by substantial economies of
scale or scope such that it operates most cost-efficiently with a single
firm serving the whole market (and under price regulation if overall
efficiency is to be maximized). The GBS project enjoys economies of
scale due to the high fixed costs of scanning books and negotiating a
class action settlement, in contrast to the low marginal costs of making
available an additional digital book copy or institutional subscription
license.147 Considerable economies of scope are potentially captured
by Google's combination of orphan works and non-orphan works,
web searches and online purchases of books, and individual users and
institutional users in its consumer base.148 However, while adminis-
tration of book licensing or distribution is highly inefficient if con-
ducted by individual rightsholders, it does not follow that that having
a single intermediary (i.e. Google) is necessarily more efficient than
using several licensing intermediaries. It all depends on the tradeoff
between allocative efficiency (derived from price competition be-
tween two or more licensing intermediaries) and productive efficiency
(due to economies of scale or scope enjoyed by a large operation like
Google, as discussed above). As Professor Katz observed in the con-
text of music performance rights licensing, "the existence of multiple
publishers [of records, CDs, and sheet music] of varying sizes suggests
that the minimum efficient scale for copyright administration . . . can
probably be achieved at scales that fall well short of a monopoly."149
The same argument can be made for the licensing and distribution of
digital books: the market is likely to operate most efficiently, consid-
ering both productive and allocative efficiency absent price regulation,
with more than a single intermediary, and the number of in-
termediaries should be comparable to the number of major book pub-
lishers and bookstores out there. Considering the tradeoff of
allocative efficiency and productive inefficiency alone, market entry is
justified, and courts should allow it, so long as gains from enhanced
intermediary competition outweigh forgone efficiencies in a more
concentrated distribution network.
But it is also important to consider the tradeoff between short-term
improvements to allocative efficiency and long-term implications for
qualitative efficiency. The prospect that any entrant can easily enter
the market and "free-ride" on Google's entry efforts may well create
147. Ji, supra note 38, at 272-73.
148. Id. at 273.
149. Katz, supra note 41, at 554.
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disincentives on the part of Google, and its competitors, to undertake
similar risky ventures in the future. Even Professor Picker, one major
critic of the GBS settlement agreement, stipulated that if a restraint is
a sine qua non for bringing about the innovation in the first place, the
antitrust response should be to permit the restraint rather than to
strike it down.150 Some might argue that the relevant "innovation"
here should be limited to developing a universal book search service,
but not a full access and distribution service, and that when Google
started the GBS project, it only envisioned "people everywhere being
able to search through all of the world's books to find the ones they're
looking for." 51 There are two responses to this argument. First,
Google's intention was at best ambiguous: shortly after announcing
the commencement of the GBS project in 2004, it invited publishers in
2006 to collaborate with it in developing a sales model for full access
to books online within the GBS system.'52 Secondly, even if Google's
original idea was to develop a universal book search system only, it
cannot be certain that Google would have moved forward with scan-
ning millions of books and risking to be sued had it known ex ante
that antitrust law would intervene to allow a competitor to readily
gain access to a broad orphan works license. Further, without Google
first developing a book search system, the offering of full access to
books (whether through consumer purchases or institutional subscrip-
tions) could hardly become a reality.153 If antitrust law required a pri-
vate company to facilitate rivals' entry should it succeed in creating a
market, it would likely perversely dissuade the company from acting
in the first place, and this is true not only for Google but any company
on the fence about whether to proceed on a risky endeavor. Where
the trade-off between allocative efficiency and qualitative efficiency is
uncertain, the general wisdom is to err on the allocative side rather
than to assume the risk of forgoing new product creation in the long
run with the ex post substitution of LRAs. This is especially true in
the book digitalization context where no other firm has thus far been
able to produce anything similar to the near universal access to books
that the GBS settlement is seeking to provide.154 The closest com-
pany is perhaps Microsoft: the computer giant previously ran a "Live
Book Search" project with the goal of assembling a library of 750,000
books (with public domain and licensed commercially available
150. Picker, supra note 71, at 3-4.
151. About Google Books: History of Google Books, GOOGLE, http://books.google.com/goog
lebooks/history.html (last visited on May 2, 2011).
152. Id.
153. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 18.
154. Id.
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works), but abandoned it in 2008 due to the lack of a sustainable busi-
ness model. 5 5 The outcome of the foregoing analysis is that granting
Google de facto exclusivity over orphan works is a necessary restraint
in order to provide sufficient incentives for Google to have developed
a universal book search and distribution network, and hence should
be upheld as legitimate under the antitrust rule of reason. It would
not be in society's interests to authorize either the Registry or UWF
to grant a collective orphan works license to a competitor of Google
which is interested in becoming a digital books intermediary.
B. Price-fixing at wholesale and retail levels
Settlement critics have expressed concerns that there will be price
fixing by rightsholders, facilitated by Google, at both the wholesale
and retail levels. 156 It is helpful to think of each rightsholder as a
"wholesaler" of a book with Google acting as the "retailer," with
Google charging the "retail markup," (the percentage of revenue ac-
cruing to Google through consumer purchases and institutional sub-
scriptions) and the remaining sales proceeds returning to each
rightsholder as the "wholesale price." The pricing of "consumer
purchases" and "institutional subscriptions" will be considered in turn.
1. Consumer purchases
It is important to understand how the pricing scheme works for in-
dividual purchases before delving into its allegedly anticompetitive as-
pects. As previously mentioned, commercially available books are by
default excluded from the Google book search and distribution sys-
tem. 57 If a rightsholder elects to have his book included in Google's
distribution system, it can set the list price of the book (at any price,
even zero) or ask Google to compute a price based on the Pricing
Algorithm.s58 There is also a hybrid mechanism whereby a right-
sholder specifies the maximum and minimum prices within which
Google can set the book price.159 In contrast, commercially unavaila-
ble books are by default included in the search and distribution sys-
tem, and Google will price these books using the Pricing Algorithm,
unless a rightsholder comes forward to set a price or ask for its exclu-
sion from the system.160 Rightsholders of orphan works, by definition,
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 128, at 398.
157. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 3.2.
158. Id. § 4.2(b), (c)(i).
159. Id.
160. Id. §§ 3.2(b), 3.3(a), 4.2(b).
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have not come forward, so there is no choice but to have Google price
these books according to the Algorithm. The default revenue split
between the rightsholder and Google is sixty-three percent to thirty-
seven percent which can be varied upwards or downwards at the re-
quest of either party (each may also elect to walk away from the trans-
action). 161 Although a rightsholder, or Google on his behalf based on
the Algorithm, is setting the retail price, it is in effect setting the
wholesale price only. This is because Google can always "provide dis-
counts off the List Prices at its sole discretion" but also at its own cost
(since the revenue split will still be based on the original List Price set
by a rightsholder, unless otherwise agreed).162 The list price specified
by the rightsholder (or under the Pricing Algorithm) therefore estab-
lishes a price ceiling that Google cannot go beyond. In other words,
there is a vertical agreement to fix maximum retail prices.
Let us first consider the Pricing Algorithm. Some settlement critics
are concerned that the Algorithm will be used by Google to facilitate
cartelization of wholesale, retail prices, or both among right-
sholders. 163 For example, Professor Picker worried that "rightholders
are collectively appointing Google as their agent to implement pricing
rules for Consumer Purchases that do not seem to mimic . . . pure
decentralized competition," which would "drive[] down prices to
costs and [would] not have the effect of maximizing revenues to indi-
vidual competitors."1 6 4 This concern was indeed a legitimate one
given how the parties drafted the pricing clause (§ 4.2(b)(i)(2)) in the
original Settlement Agreement. Under the original clause, the Pricing
Algorithm was "design[ed] to find the optimal such price for each
Book and, accordingly, to maximize revenue for each Right-
sholder."165 This effectively meant that Google should set a schedule
of cartel prices for all books simultaneously that would maximize rev-
enue (and hence profits, since the marginal cost of producing a digital
book copy is zero) for all rightsholders collectively. 16 6 Indeed, this
was not different than an express cartel among rightsholders, with
Google acting as the central decision-maker, to fix retail and whole-
sale prices with a view to earning monopoly profits for the industry
(note: whether a book cartel is itself sustainable is a separate issue,
which will be discussed shortly). Such simultaneous price setting
161. Id. § 2.1(a).
162. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, §§ 3.2., 4.5(b)(i).
163. Picker, supra note 128, at 398.
164. Id.
165. Settlement Agreement, supra note 133, § 4.2(b)(i)(2).
166. See Elhauge, supra note 38, at 37; Fraser, supra note 38, at 13.
[Vol. 10:1
RULE OF REASON AND THE GBS SETTLEMENT
would be complicated, requiring knowledge of the entire matrix of
pricing elasticities of books, but it is very much within Google's capac-
ity given its significant computing power and ability to run sophisti-
cated pricing experiments. 167 In response to this cartelization
concern, therefore, the pricing clause has been modified as part of the
Amended Settlement Agreement. Under § 4.2(b)(i)(2) of the present
agreement, the Pricing Algorithm is now configured to "find the opti-
mal price for each . . . Book in order to maximize revenues for the
Rightsholder for each such Book and without regard to changes to the
price of any other Book (but Google may use historical price data of
other Books in designing the Pricing Algorithm)."' 6 8  Section
4.2(c)(ii)(2) goes on to provide that "[tihe Pricing Algorithm ... will
be designed to operate in a manner that simulates how an individual
Book would be priced by a Rightsholder of that Book acting in a man-
ner to optimize revenues in respect of such Book in a competitive
market . . . assuming no change in the price of any other Book."169
The present Pricing Algorithm is therefore seeking to simulate a
Bertrand pricing game: each rightsholder will set a price for each book
individually taking prices of other books as exogenous; competition
between digital books will presumably drive prices down to marginal
costs (essentially zero) plus a premium reflecting the differentiated
nature of books.170 Professor Picker was mistaken in suggesting that
competition always drives prices down to cost and that producers in a
competitive environment do not maximize revenues and profits. The
reality is that producers always aim to maximize profits by producing
up to the point where marginal revenue (MR) meets marginal cost
(MC), and this is true irrespective of whether the applicable competi-
tive model is perfect competition, monopoly, or something in between
(such as a differentiated, monopolistically competitive market for digi-
tal books in the present case). MR equaling MC is not a sufficient
condition for P equaling MC; the fact that books are differentiated
products suggests that every rightsholder has some degree of market
power enabling him to price above MC. Absent coordination be-
tween rightsholders, this price will be lower than the cartel and mo-
nopoly price. In fact, the producer surplus that a rightsholder earns
by pricing above MC (which approximates to zero for digital books,
typical of digital copyrights) plays a significant role in incentivizing
innovation (i.e. the authorship of books) in the first place. Although
167. Fraser, supra note 38, at 14.
168. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.2(b)(i)(2).
169. Id. § 4.2(c)(ii)(2).
170. Fraser, supra note 38, at 13.
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the Pricing Algorithm does not bring prices down to MC, it does pre-
clude any form of horizontal collusion: not only express cartel pricing,
but also tacit collusion that is typical of oligopolistic markets, since
Google is required to price any book "without regard to changes
to" 7 1 and "assuming no change in the price of any other Book." 172
As Professor Elhauge observed, antitrust law does not prevent a right-
sholder from responding intelligently to rival price changes or consid-
ering effects on rival prices, at least in the absence of "plus factors,"
such as extremely improbable confidence, actions contrary to self-in-
terest, and ruinous industry conditions.173 Since the Algorithm will
only result in more competitive prices than individual price setting by
rightsholders, which can be elected so long as the rights holder is not
an orphan work owner, the court should characterize it as procompeti-
tive, not anticompetitive.17 4
What of the argument that agreed-upon pricing formulas among
competitors are always anticompetitive and should be condemned as
per se illegal, as some precedents seem to suggest?' 75 Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp have provided some useful guidance for de-
termining whether agreed-pricing formulas raise anticompetitive
concerns:
The principal danger of agreed-upon pricing formulas is that they
enable competing sellers to track one another's pricing more read-
ily. For example, if real estate brokers agree to use fees based on a
percentage of sale service, any deviation from the "going" commis-
sion rate is readily detected. But if a broker uses some alternative
formula, such as payment by the hour or by the transaction, then
interseller pricing verification can be much more difficult. 176
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a formula that is principle-based but
not rule-based, conveying the basic idea that Google will charge con-
sumers prices in a competitive Nash-Bertrand market, will have the
effect of facilitating inter-seller verification. In fact, market conditions
suggest that detection of cheating in a digital book market will be for-
midably difficult, as will be explained below. To the extent that legal
precedents suggest that the use of pricing formulas are per se illegal,
they are wrongly decided and should not be applied to condemn the
171. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.2(b)(i)(2).
172. Id. § 4.2(c)(ii)(2).
173. See Elhauge, supra note 38, at 38; PHILLIP E. AREEDA& Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, & CASES 227-30 (6th ed. 2004).
174. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 38.
175. Sce, e.g., Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1969); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 198-99, 222-23; Va. Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256
F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958).
176. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 20.25(d).
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Pricing Algorithm in the GBS settlement. Having said that, Google's
use of a set of pre-defined discrete "pricing bins" (i.e. books processed
under the Pricing Algorithm will be given a price of either $1.99,
$2.99, $3.99, and so forth until $14.99, $19.99 and $29.99)177 is ques-
tionable from an antitrust point of view. Professor Picker does not
think that "this centralized . . . approach matches what would emerge
from normal, decentralized competition."17 8 Indeed, the pricing-bin
approach seems to fall squarely within the Socony-Vaccum rule that it
is price fixing if "the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level
or on ascending or descending scales." 179 A cursory search on Ama-
zon.com would reveal that a large number of books are priced at the
margin of $0.01, the lowest currency denomination in the U.S.180 As
electronic forms of payment have become almost exclusive in online
commerce, there seems to be no convincing argument based on trans-
action costs or Google's productive efficiency that could justify the use
of pricing bins in dollar intervals; they should therefore be abandoned
for lack of a procompetitive justification.
Regardless of how the Pricing Algorithm operates, essential ele-
ments of successful collusion, the ability to reach a consensus, to de-
tect and punish cheating, and to maintain supra-competitive prices,181
are apparently lacking in the digitized books market. Product differ-
entiation is perhaps the most significant factor rendering unlikely any
form of collusion among rightsholders. 8 2 A prominent antitrust and
IP treatise has observed that "individual books are extremely differen-
tiated from one another in consumers' eyes and many titles are not
even regarded as 'competing' with one another." 83 Any agreement
between rightsholders would require some understood relationship
between different books so that their rightsholders could agree upon
the appropriate price differentials.18 4 However, given the significant
degree of differentiation among books, "differences in consumer pref-
erence will make a consensus more difficult to attain and may give
one participant significant advantage over others."18 Other market
conditions also diminish the chance of successful collusion between
177. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.2(c)(ii)(1).
178. Picker, supra note 128, at 398.
179. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222.
180. For example, Judge Posner's "The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy" and "How Judges
Think" were priced at $17.13 and $12.89 respectively on May 2, 2011.
181. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 173, at 204-05.
182. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLEs APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 30.4, at 30-16 (3d ed. 2004).
183. Id. §30.4, at 30-16, 30-17.
184. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 173, at 205.
185. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 182, § 30.4, at 30-36.
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rightsholders: (1) authors and publishers are numerous, rendering co-
ordination and detection difficult; (2) barriers to entry are low, since
anyone who can write has a chance of being published; (3) many right-
sholders who are individual authors or academics value wider reader-
ship over profit-making and have incentives to cheat by lowering
prices of their books;186 and (4) there is no effective mechanism for
punishing any cheating identified inside or outside the settlement
agreement. 87
If there is no price fixing at the retail level, there will not be whole-
sale price fixing given the structure of the royalty division arrange-
ment between Google and rightsholders under the settlement
agreement. The default sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent
revenue split between rightsholders and Google means that the
wholesale price is by default thirty-seven percent of the list price of
any book, which is the final retail price assuming no discounts from
Google. If the retail price ($P) is competitive under Nash-Bertrand
market conditions, the competitive price at wholesale level would be
thirty-seven percent multiplied by the retail price; a competitive price
at the wholesale level. Although the wholesale price varies precisely
with the retail price in percentage terms, the revenue split itself does
not affect the incentives of any rightsholder (or Google on its behalf)
to set a competitive price to maximize revenues and profits for his
book absent collusion.'88 Some might argue that a fixed royalty split
would lead to some form of wholesale price stability, but one should
note that the sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent split is only
the default royalty split. Indeed, if the distribution makeup based on
the default split is inefficient in promoting sales for a commercially
available book, either Google or a rightsholder has the incentive and
the right to ask for an upward or downward adjustment in the split, or
to opt out of the transaction altogether.189
Nevertheless, there seems to be no convincing justification for why
the settlement parties have not extended this renegotiation power to
cover commercially unavailable books. 190 This is a particularly worry-
ing feature given that commercially unavailable books form the over-
whelming majority of books covered under the settlement.191
Although it is impossible for orphan work authors to negotiate a reve-
186. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Or-
phan Books, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 411, 433-34 (2009).
187. Id. at 434.
188. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 39.
189. See id. at 40; Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.5(a)(iii).
190. See Ji, supra note 38, at 259.
191. Id.
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nue split with Google, it is submitted that the scope of the renegoti-
ation power should be expanded to cover commercially unavailable
works with traceable rightsholders. It is true that allowing bargaining
for out-of-print books would create negotiation costs, but such costs
are high only in a bilateral monopoly situation where Google has sub-
stantial buyer power and a rightsholder has substantial seller power.
But unless one is the author of a bestselling title or is a large publisher
owning the copyright of many books, it is inconceivable that an ordi-
nary rightsholder would have significant bargaining power vis-a-vis
Google that would empower him to request for a substantial revenue
share or outright exclusion of its book. In fact, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that many rightsholders would not exercise this renegotiation
power, which means that Google, and hence society, would not have
to incur high transaction costs due to negotiation with numerous par-
ties. But this does not mean the majority of books would be sold at
around the same wholesale price: significant price differentials would
still remain at the wholesale level simply because of the highly differ-
entiated nature of books.
There was previously a scheme of minimum resale price mainte-
nance (RPM) under the settlement agreement. Section 4.5(b) of the
original settlement agreement only allows Google to provide "tempo-
rary discounts" from list prices set by rightsholders, or set by Google
based on the Pricing Algorithm; the relevant rightsholder and the
Registry must approve any discounts for more than a temporary dura-
tion.192 However, the settlement parties removed the RPM scheme
and they have only retained maximum retail price limitation (analyzed
below) under the amended settlement. This was presumably a re-
sponse to the DOJ's criticism regarding "restrictions on retail price
competition" in its amicus brief.193 It is indeed questionable whether
the removal of RPM is necessary and desirable, especially in light of
Leegin in which the Supreme Court held that courts should test any
RPM scheme under the rule of reason instead of condemning it as per
se illegal.194 The primary anticompetitive concern of RPM, its facilita-
tion of either a manufacturer or retailer cartel, 195 is apparently absent
in the present case, since Google is the only retailer and any collusion
among rightsholders at the wholesale level is highly unlikely for rea-
192. Settlement Agreement, supra note 133, § 4.5(b).
193. Statement of Interest of the U.S.A. Regarding Proposed Class Settlement at 21-22, Au-
thors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.pdf.
194. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
195. Id. at 892-93.
2011] 35
36 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
sons already explained above. On the contrary, a RPM scheme car-
ries a strong procompetitive justification of incentivizing distribution
services and preventing free riding.196 Rightsholders may wish to pro-
vide Google with a guaranteed distribution margin so as to incentivize
the latter, as with other Internet or physical booksellers, to provide
better promotional services or recommendation of books, which
would induce their demand. 197 The above analysis suggests that the
original RPM scheme is procompetitive for it enhances interbrand
competition without any sacrifice of intrabrand competition. The par-
ties should therefore have retained the scheme in their settlement
agreement to be later approved by the court after conducting a rule of
reason analysis.
As for maximum resale price limitation, it should be seen as a solu-
tion to the classic problem of double marginalization. A producer, or
any downstream firm, with some degree of market power, as in the
case of monopolistic competition in a market of differentiated books,
will set its wholesale price at some level above MC. This results in an
output lower than that observed under conditions of perfect competi-
tion. A retailer who possesses market power at the retail level will
then take this wholesale price as given and set a supracompetitive re-
tail price at a level further above MC. This causes a further reduction
in market output, which is undesirable for both the producer (due to
fewer sales and hence lower profits) and the consumer (who either
faces a higher price or is turned away despite his willingness to pay
above MC of the product). Maximum resale price limitation is there-
fore an effective solution to the problem: a rightsholder now specifies
the maximum price at which Google can sell its digital rights in a par-
ticular book, thus limiting Google to a competitive markup. 198
Meanwhile, the potential competitive evils of maximum resale price
fixing are apparently absent. For example, one anticompetitive possi-
bility is that rightsholders set a wrong retail price, one that is unduly
low, that would limit dealer services. Market forces, however, would
swiftly correct this with Google negotiating for a higher royalty share
(for example, a fifty percent split instead of sixty-three percent to
thirty-seven percent) or insisting to drop the book for "non-editorial
reasons" unless the rightsholder agrees to raise the retail price, and
hence the retail markup, to an efficient level. 199 Another potential
concern is that a maximum resale price is in fact a minimum price in
196. Id. at 890-91.
197. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 34 n.58.
198. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 758(c).
199. Id. § 1637(e).
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disguise. However, such disguise would rarely be successful; 200 and in
any event, for reasons already mentioned, any RPM scheme would
only be procompetitive in the present context and should be en-
couraged. Since the maximum resale price limitation operates
procompetitively against double marginalization and does not raise
anticompetitive concerns, it should remain in the settlement agree-
ment (if not coupled with a restored RPM scheme) with the expecta-
tion that courts would approve the retail price cap under the antitrust
rule of reason.
2. Institutional subscriptions
Apart from consumer purchases, Google will offer institutional sub-
scriptions-essentially blanket licenses that cover all commercially un-
available books eligible for consumer purchase through Google and
commercially available books that rightsholders elect to include the
institutional subscription-to corporations, educational institutions,
the government, and other institutions. Pricing of institutional sub-
scriptions in accordance with the two objectives is set out in
§ 4.1(a)(i): "(1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each
Book . . . and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books by the
public, including institutions of higher education."201 As with con-
sumer purchases, some settlement critics fear that the settlement will
provide Google with a monopoly in collective licensing of books and
accordingly the power to charge supracompetitive prices.202 This con-
cern was doubted by Professor Elhauge, who argues that the objec-
tives of charging "market rates" and ensuring "broad access ... by the
public" entail that "institutional subscriptions must be priced low
enough to produce the sort of broad access that is consistent with the
market output that would exist with competitive pricing." 203
Leaving aside the issue of implementing the pricing objectives, does
Google's charging of monopoly prices for institutional subscriptions
raise antitrust concerns at all? Two important factors suggest that the
answer is negative. First, Google is seeking to offer a new product: a
blanket license for digital access to a near-universal collection of
books. This product is "new," for it is qualitatively distinguishable
from individual books or its closest substitute-physical access to the
200. Id. § 1637(c).
201. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.1(a)(i).
202. Picker, supra note 128, at 397; see also Robert Darnton, Google & the Future of Books,
THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.nybooks.con/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/
googie-the-future-of-booksl.
203. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 53.
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largest library in the world. The ability to access millions of volumes
of books from any remote location without delays due to recall or
interlibrary transfers is surely much more productive to academic re-
search. 204 Users can perform keyword searches on a universal
database of books without necessarily knowing which ones are useful
to them beforehand. 205 As books continue to accumulate on this
database, Google's books search system can grow into the book-
equivalent of Westlaw (a database of court judgments and legislation)
or HeinOnline (a database of legal journals). As noted earlier,
Google's institutional subscription closely analogizes to ASCAP's or
BMI's blanket license for music performing rights. The Supreme
Court remarked in BMI that the blanket license is a "different prod-
uct" that should be "differentiate[d] . . . from individual use licenses,"
for "[i]t allows the licensee immediate use of covered compositions,
without the delay of prior individual negotiations, and great flexibility
in the choice of music material."206 That the blanket license is a new
product that creates substantial qualitative efficiencies is the decisive
reason behind the Supreme Court's ruling that courts should test the
pricing of the blanket license under the rule of reason.207 On remand,
the Second Circuit relied on copyright owners' "unimpaired indepen-
dence" to grant individual licenses to users to uphold the blanket li-
censing scheme under a rule of reason analysis.208 As noted
previously, the blanket license under the GBS settlement is in many
ways less restrictive and more procompetitive than the ASCAP and
BMI scheme, suggesting that Google's pricing of institutional sub-
scriptions could hardly raise any antitrust problems.
Some might argue that despite the overall procompetitiveness of
the blanket license as being a new product, it would not be an LRA to
prevent Google from charging monopoly prices by imposing some
form of price ceiling for Google's institutional subscription service.
This leads us to the second point-the limits of antitrust in terms of
price control. It is important to note that unlike E.U. competition
law, U.S. antitrust law does not impose liability for a firm's charging of
excessive or monopoly prices.209 The Supreme Court famously re-
204. Hausman & Sidak, supra note 186, at 419.
205. Ethauge, supra note 38, at 52.
206. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979).
207. Id. at 23-24.
208. CBS, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir.
1980).
209. See Case C-385/07 P, Der Grine Punkt - Duales System Deutschland GmbH v.
Comm'n, (2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/ (click the case number and
then click on the "opinion" link), for a case in which the European Commission found excessive
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marked in Trinko that "[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly
prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 'business acumen'
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth." 210 Google's charging of supracompetitive sub-
scription fees can therefore be seen as "procompetitive" from an ex
ante perspective as it serves as the prize rewarding Google for its in-
novation and entrepreneurship in undertaking the GBS project. In
any event, to place an ex post ceiling on institutional subscription
charges would amount to price regulation, something that antitrust
authorities have painstakingly sought to avoid.211 Society would not
improve if antitrust authorities simply substituted their valuation of a
product or service for that of the transacting parties, here Google and
the institutional subscribers. On the other hand, there could hardly be
an objective measure of what constitutes an "excessive" or "monop-
oly" price. Under EU competition law, prices are considered "exces-
sive" if they bear "no reasonable relation to the economic value of the
product" and will constitute an abuse of dominance in violation of
Article 102 of the TFEU.212 But isn't the "economic value" of a prod-
uct precisely how much a consumer values the product-his "willing-
ness to pay" (WTP) as described by that product's demand curve? If
the EU authorities meant that a price is excessive if it is significantly
higher (hence bearing "no reasonable relation") to a consumer's
WTP, which consumer along a downward-sloping demand curve are
they referring to? Even if they manage to pick the "right" consumer,
how much below this consumer's WTP should constitute a safe harbor
for pricing? Given these conceptual difficulties of defining the bound-
aries for illegally high prices, it is indeed sound antitrust policy not to
condemn the charging of excessive prices ex post. In any case, it is
inconceivable that Google would start charging exorbitant subscrip-
tion fees, since doing so would threaten the Internet giant with reputa-
tional sanctions (and consequently, loss of advertising revenue) and
the risk of losing large institutional customers in the aftermath.
Apart from the two pricing objectives under § 4.1(a)(i), Google also
plans to implement third-degree price discrimination for its institu-
tional subscriptions.213 This is a kind of imperfect discrimination, aim-
pricing by a dominant firm to constitute an Article 102 abuse; see, e.g., Case 226/84, British
Leyland v. EC Comm'n, 1986 E.C.R. 3263 (1986), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/
juris/ (click the case number); see also Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207
(1978), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/ (click on the case number).
210. Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
211. Id. at 408.
212. United Brands, E.C.R. at 301.
213. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.1(a)(i).
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ing to extract as much consumer surplus (that would be observed
under perfectly competitive conditions) as possible by charging differ-
ent customer groups different prices that approximate their different
valuations of the product. Google plans to vary subscription fees ac-
cording to the number of full time equivalents (FTEs) 2 1 4 and the na-
ture of the institution (i.e., corporate, higher education, school,
government, or others). 215 One critic pointed out that FTE pricing is
"neither an accurate nor fair gauge of the true value of the product"
and could possibly lead to public libraries and universities (with a
large of patrons) being priced out of the market.216 He therefore rec-
ommended that Google price subscriptions based on actual usage pat-
terns according to a simulations pricing model.217
This criticism reflects a misunderstanding of the economics behind
price discrimination. In fact, an FTE price, which is designed to track
an institution's willingness and ability to pay, better reflects the "true
value of the product" with respect to that institution than a price
based on usage patterns (which does not capture the earning power
aspect of willingness to pay). The same arguments against condemna-
tion of excessive pricing noted above also apply here: to render illegal
a pricing scheme that does not "fair[ly] gauge ... the true value of the
product" is bound to cause definitional problems and harm rather
than good to economic efficiency. 218
In fact, third-degree price discrimination is usually procompetitive
and courts should not condemn such conduct on antitrust grounds
without a detailed analysis of its competitive effects. Since third-de-
gree price discrimination is imperfect, there is no dispute in that mar-
ket output will be lower than the perfectly competitive level. But
perfectly competitive pricing and output will never be observed in sit-
uations where price discrimination is feasible. Persistent price dis-
crimination requires some degree of market power, as where the
market consists of differentiated products. 219 This means even in the
absence of price discrimination, the seller would be charging a price
above MC, or a "monopoly price" in the broad sense. Whether third-
degree price discrimination is pro- or anti-competitive will depend on
214. Full time equivalents are figures representing the number of full time employees or stu-
dents at an institution.
215. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.1(a)(iii)-(iv).
216. Christopher A. Suarez, Continued DOJ Oversight of the Google Book Search Settlement:
Defending our Public Values and Protecting Competition, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 202-03
(2010-11).
217. Id. at 203.
218. Id.
219. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 721(c).
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whether it enhances output compared to market conditions under
nondiscriminatory monopoly pricing. If the discrimination is output
reducing, it is anticompetitive for it results in incremental deadweight
loss vis-d-vis the nondiscriminatory monopoly situation (added to this
is the social loss in rent-seeking behavior: the seller's expenses in iden-
tifying and segregating different customer groups). 220 Even then, anti-
trust intervention may not be justified if market correction is possible,
that is, if new entrants can enter the market to serve customers priced
out of the market because of discrimination and undercut the "mo-
nopolist" with respect to its existing sales. Economic theory therefore
suggests that antitrust law should only intervene if price discrimina-
tion is accompanied by an exclusionary practice such as predatory
pricing.221
This economic thinking is reflected in the Robinson-Patman Act
provisions relevant to price discrimination.222 To allege a primary line
violation,223 the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant is us-
ing high prices in one market to subsidize losses due to predatory pric-
ing in another market.224 The Act therefore effectively subsumes
primary-line price discrimination under antitrust law's predatory pric-
ing doctrine. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brooke Group,225
just as in a case of predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff must show that a defendant seller is pricing below cost with
regard to a particular market, and a dangerous probability of recoup-
ment of the loss. 226 To apply it to the present case, this would require
proof that Google is making a loss on sales to a particular customer
group and is offsetting this loss by selling profitably to another group.
Putting aside the difficulty of proving recoupment, pricing below cost
is most unlikely to be found when it comes to selling IP rights; the
marginal cost of making available access to another buyer is close to
220. HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, at 577.
221. See id. (indicating that this is particularly true if the market is competitive or
oligopolistic).
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006) (amending the Clayton Act in 1936).
223. See EINER R. ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND Eco-
NOMics 366, 689 (2007) (indicating that a primary line violation is price discrimination that af-
fects competition at the seller's level. The anticompetitive concern is that the seller is using high
prices in one area to subsidize predatory prices in another; the lower price is targeted at custom-
ers of the seller's rivals and will discipline the rivals or drive them out of the market).
224. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, at 581.
225. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
226. Id. The only difference between Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act is that the
former applies only to predatory pricing that facilitates a single-firm monopoly (therefore re-
quiring proof of monopoly power), whereas the latter applies to predatory pricing that might
facilitate oligopoly as well; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, at 367, 579.
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zero.2 2 7 It should be noted that secondary line violation under the
Robinson-Patman Act is irrelevant here since institutions subscribing
to Google's blanket license are not competing in any downstream
market; they are not in the business of reselling the access rights to
any buyer that is further downstream. 228
One commentator has argued that Google should offer "narrower
licensing alternatives" (e.g., a subscription covering only medical
books specifically for medical schools) 2 2 9 if they are "shown to be
more efficient than broader blanket licenses in the book digitization
context" and that Google's refusal to offer narrower alternatives
"could raise antitrust concerns." 230 However, it is difficult to see why
having Google offer narrower licenses would lead to a more procom-
petitive result. It is not even obvious that specific institutions, such as
law schools or medical schools, would necessarily be paying lower
prices for a tailor-made subscription. The MC of making available
another digital book copy is zero for Google, which is typical of most
blanket licensing arrangements charging a lump-sum fee upfront (an
example is the ASCAP and BMI music-performing license). In any
event, the licensing fee that an institution pays Google is only a pure
wealth transfer. In contrast, it costs more to the licensor, and to soci-
ety, to offer several tailor-made licenses than to offer one full blanket
license, since the former involves additional costs of categorization
and resolving or avoiding disputes over the scope of a specific li-
cense. 231 This is the court's primary reason for rejecting the plaintiff's
request for "mini" licenses of country and western music in BMI v.
Moor-Law: the court did not find BMI's refusal to offer narrower li-
censes to constitute an illegal tie-in as the licenses would be "signifi-
cantly more expensive to administer than a full repertory one" 23 2 and
that "'mini' blanket licenses [were] not a practical alternative." 233 In
any event, a claim for narrower licensing alternatives in the present
context will likely fail the standard requirements for establishing an-
ticompetitive tying or bundled pricing: (1) coercion; (2) separate tying
227. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 182, § 13.5(b). Though this raises the issue of whether
MC is the appropriate metric by which to judge predatory pricing in information markets. Some
commentators have argued that average cost (AC) is a more appropriate measure since it ac-
counts for the upfront research and development costs that the IP creator has incurred before
commercializing his IP rights. There has also been a long-running debate in regulated industries
as to whether regulators should allow public utilities to charge prices tied to AC or MC.
228. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 223.
229. Suarez, supra note 216, at 201.
230. Id. at 200.
231. Broad. Music Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763 (D. Del. 1981).
232. Id. at 767
233. Id. at 769.
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and tied products; (3) tying product power; and (4) a significant fore-
closure of the tied product market.234 The second issue is whether the
institutional subscription is a tie-in of the desired narrower licenses or
a single, new product; the essential question being whether assembling
two components into a single package would create synergies (qualita-
tive efficiency) or cost savings (productive efficiency). Similar to the
music licensing situation, it would be costly for Google to tailor its
blanket license to suit the preferences of each and every institution as
the company would run into troubles of categorizing books and defin-
ing the scope of works covered by each type of subscription. Antitrust
should not intervene on cost-saving arrangements even if certain cus-
tomers would prefer a predefined subset of works in the licensor's
library.235 As to the fourth condition, foreclosure only occurs if a
buyer would have purchased the tied product separately from an al-
ternative seller had he be given the opportunity. 236 This will not be
the case here since the licensees (institutions) do not want the tied
copyrights-i.e. access to books of no relevance or interest to them-
at all, since no rival licensor is being foreclosed. The lack of foreclo-
sure or other anticompetitive effects suggests that there is no antitrust
concern in Google's insistence on offering a single institutional sub-
scription covering the universe of GBS books as opposed to narrower,
institution-specific licenses.
C. Proposed Modifications
The relevant question here is the following: can aspects of the set-
tlement agreement be modified or can new features be added onto the
settlement to enhance the procompetitiveness of the GBS project?
There are three categories of modifications that Google and right-
sholders ought to consider: (1) scope of works; (2) new revenue mod-
els; and (3) the offering of complementary and derivative services.
As to the scope of works, the present settlement only covers com-
mercially unavailable books, including orphan works.237 Commer-
cially available books and books published after January 5, 2009 are
excluded unless and until Google strikes a deal with the relevant right-
sholders regarding online search and sales.2 38 Since commercially
available books currently constitute ninety-seven percent of total
234. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37-41 (1984); HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 182, § 22.3.
235. Broad. Music Inc., 527 F.Supp. at 765, n.7; HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 182, § 22.3(b).
236. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 182, § 22.4(a)(2).
237. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 3.2.
238. Id. §§ 1.97, 3.2.
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books sales in the U.S.,239 excluding these books from GBS system
will greatly reduce its value as a centralized book distribution and re-
search platform. Although commercially available books are unlikely
to be orphan works, it is complicated and costly for Google to identify
each and every rightsholder, contact them individually to strike an in-
dependent deal, and repeat the process again for every book pub-
lished in the future. Further complications are caused by the
following two factors: (1) it is often unclear whether the publisher or
the author has digital rights in a book since the contract between them
may not have anticipated digitalization, so neither party may be will-
ing to grant Google a license and bear the risk of being sued by the
other party;240 and (2) tracing copyright usually goes beyond simply
identifying the author since the right may have been transferred by
contracts, corporate mergers, estates, or operation of statutory provi-
sions.241 The complicated process of rights clearance entails, at least
for newly published books, that Google will be slower than its com-
petitors, such as Amazon or physical bookstores, in launching a new
sale, thereby inhibiting the growth of the digital book market.
There is thus a strong case for changing the display and distribution
of commercially available books from an opt-in to an opt-out to en-
hance the procompetitive effects of the GBS settlement. Not only
would an opt-out system lead to transaction cost savings and expe-
dited book distribution, but it would also build a near-universal collec-
tion of books and hence increase the inherent value of the GBS
system. For example, in order for Google's institutional subscription
to become a comprehensive research tool, it is important for the sys-
tem to include all academic books across various disciplines, irrespec-
tive of their commercial availability and publication date. It would
certainly defeat the purpose if students and researches still had to
search a physical library for the most recently published books which
remain commercially available. The GBS project partly aims to pro-
mote equalization of resources among higher education institutions.242
The ultimate goal is therefore to build a digital corpus of millions of
books from major research libraries that will be made available
through institutional subscriptions at reasonable prices, so that every
library around the world will instantly share the features of a world-
239. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 39 n.63.
240. Id. at 30-31.
241. Sag, supra note 2, at 71-72.
242. Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2009) [hereinafter Drummond Testimony] (testimony of David Drum-
mond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer, Google, Inc.).
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class research facility.243 The exclusion of commercially available and
post-2009-published books could only mean that major universities
and colleges would continue to dominate the resource-constrained in-
stitutions in terms of academic resources and scholarly research.
On the other hand, an opt-out system for commercially available
books is naturally free from anticompetitive concerns. It will not con-
fer on Google exclusivity over such books-individual rightsholders
will still have the discretion to sell them at any price through any dis-
tributor or multiple distributors. In fact, an opt-out system will help
to promote retail price competition and increase output by automati-
cally adding a new distributor-Google-with low distribution costs
and without delay in shipping.244 A more comprehensive GBS system
will also help to lower entry or expansion barriers for rivals by provid-
ing sellers with information on digital demand for new books and pur-
chasers with an online platform by which they can easily search for
books they want.2 4 5 Some may argue that substituting opt-in with opt-
out distribution may create a windfall for Google since rivals will be
facing higher costs having to negotiate individual deals for every new
publication. To ensure that Google and its rivals compete on a level
playing field, the settlement agreement should be modified to allow
the Registry to grant collective licenses to Google's rivals over the
scanning and distribution of commercially available and future books
subject to rightsholders' choice to opt out at any time.
The parties earlier amended the settlement agreement to exclude
foreign works-books not published in the U.S., Canada, the United
Kingdom, or Australia-from its scope. 246 U.S. copyright law protects
many foreign works, even without registration or publication in the
U.S.247 These works were excluded due to the concern over the ade-
quacy of representation of foreign rightsholders and hence the ability
to meet the requirements of Rule 23 for class action settlement ap-
proval. 248 From an antitrust perspective, however, the exclusion of
foreign works will severely undermine the procompetitiveness of the
GBS system. The change will reduce the coverage of the project by
almost fifty percent249 and will further entrench the dominance of En-
243. Samuelson, supra note 128, at 1310, 1339.
244. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 34-35.
245. Id. at 35 (noting that research by economists had shown that websites such as Amazon.
corn greatly facilitated the searching of a wide variety of books online, which led to an increase
in consumer welfare from $731 million to $1.03 billion).
246. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 1.19.
247. Sag, supra note 2, at 39.
248. Statement of Interest of the U.S.A., supra note 193, at 5.
249. Sag, supra note 2, at 39.
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glish language works in the GBS database. 250 It will hence undermine
the utility of the GBS system as a comprehensive research tool and
will impede the journey towards resource equalization among global
academic institutions, similar to the effects of excluding commercially
available books.
The inclusion of foreign works will only enhance the procompetitive
effects of the GBS settlement. With regard to Google's sales of for-
eign works within the U.S. market, they increase outputs since such
works were unlikely offered for sale in the U.S. previously. Google is
in no way free-riding on the efforts of foreign authors and publishers
since it is only getting thirty-seven percent of the sales revenue (by
default)-the remaining sixty-three percent goes to the foreign right-
sholders and the split is always variable at the latter's discretion.
These incremental sales of foreign works are Pareto-efficient: they en-
hance the utility and profit of U.S. consumers, Google, and also for-
eign rightsholders without making anybody worse off. As regards
Google's sales of foreign works outside the U.S., the enhanced retail
price competition between Google and existing foreign booksellers
will help to reduce retail price and expand output, which ultimately
benefits both foreign consumers and rightsholders in terms of higher
consumer and producer surplus. Google will not have exclusivity over
the distribution of foreign works, so rightsholders remain free to sell
them through Google's rivals at any price they desire, whether in the
U.S. or abroad. According to the above analysis, the fact the foreign
rightsholders might not be adequately represented should not be a
concern after all, since Google's distribution of foreign works in the
U.S. or overseas could only make these rightsholders better off, not
worse off.
The definition of "books" under the settlement agreement expressly
excludes periodicals, personal papers, calendars, sheet music,
songbooks, and government works (the last category is not copyright
protected). 251 There seems to be no good reason for excluding sheet
music and songbooks from the GBS system if other utility works-
such as cookbooks, atlases, and do-it-yourself guidebooks-are in-
cluded. But it seems justified to exclude other product categories if
some sensible line is to be drawn between books and non-books. The
exclusion is necessary to prevent Google from becoming a "supermar-
ket" of all digital products, which, unlike the case of Amazon and
eBay, are distributed under an opt-out but not opt-in system. In any
250. Id. at 40.
251. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 1.19(i)-(vi).
[Vol. 10:1
RULE OF REASON AND THE GBS SETrLEMENT
event, periodicals and academic papers are already readily available
from institutionally subscribed databases (such as Westlaw and Hei-
nOnline) and free research distribution networks (such as the Social
Science Research Network), so it will be largely redundant to also in-
clude them in the GBS system. Besides, anyone who wants a book-
form calendar will prefer to buy them in printed form, allowing
Google to distribute scanned versions of printed calendars electroni-
cally will do little to enhance efficiency simply due to their lack of
demand. Periodicals, personal papers, and calendars are hence right-
fully excluded from the GBS settlement.
The settlement agreement contemplates several new revenue mod-
els on which Google and rightsholders have yet to agree. 252 First,
there are added features of print-on-demand (allowing purchasers to
obtain a print copy of commercially unavailable books from a third
party) 2 5 3 and file-download (enabling purchasers to download the on-
line books as electronic files that can be read on mobile phones, e-
book devices, and other electronic devices). 254 The print-on-demand
feature is procompetitive for it will enable GBS-distributed books to
compete directly with hardcopy sales sold through physical or online
bookstores, and there seems to be no reason why the feature should
not be expanded to cover commercially available books especially af-
ter they have become part of the opt-out distribution system proposed
above. Meanwhile, the file-download service will enable GBS books
to enter into direct competition with electronic books currently only
available on a Kindle, Nook, or other proprietary devices. The only
concern for allowing the downloading of GBS books is piracy of digi-
tal books and the diminished incentives for authorship that may fol-
low. But the piracy problem can be easily resolved by utilizing digital-
rights-management technology. Files downloaded from the GBS sys-
tem can be configured so that they can only be read using a Google-
designated software program. The program itself can be installed in
any electronic device including desktop computers, laptops, mobile
phones, e-readers, and portable media players, so as to ensure me-
dium neutrality. In order to prevent unauthorized distribution of
GBS files to multiple electronic devices for use by multiple users, each
GBS-program must be registered online using a unique name and a
buyer of a GBS book can specify up to five to ten unique names which
will have the right to access the purchased copy. In this way, every
copy of a GBS book will be used only by a limited number of users on
252. Id. § 4.7.
253. Id. § 4.7(a).
254. Id. § 4.7(b).
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a limited number of electronic devices, which can effectively solve the
piracy and disincentive issue. On the other hand, the General Coun-
sel of Google claimed that it has plans to partner with bookstores,
publishers, and device manufacturers to develop an open platform
whereby readers can purchase electronic books from any bookstore
and read them on multiple electronic devices from multiple ven-
dors.2 55 While the movement towards medium neutrality and a single
standard for digital books is itself welcoming, antitrust authorities
must make sure the partnership is not a pretext for cartelization
among distributors of digital books and manufacturers of electronic
reading devices. As noted above, a cartel among rightsholders over
multitudes of books would be difficult to sustain; but this is not neces-
sarily true for a distribution cartel in respect of the same book and a
manufacturing cartel over a handful of electronic reading devices with
minimal differential features that separate them.
The second new revenue model is consumer subscription, which is
an individualized version of the institutionally subscribed blanket li-
cense under the existing agreement.256 Consumer subscriptions will
suit the needs of an individual who does not have access to an institu-
tional subscription but needs to "sample" a range of books in a partic-
ular field before delving into the details of a particular book.
Examples of such individuals would be potential Ph.D. students writ-
ing research proposals for their doctoral applications or a freelance
writer authoring a new book pending submission to a commercial
publisher. Without the consumer subscription, such individuals will
choose not to buy the books at all (since they do not know which ones
are useful and purchasing individual books is too costly anyway) and
will resort to whatever resource that is available in a nearby public
library. Introducing the consumer subscription is hence procompeti-
tive because of its output-enhancing effect. The subscription service
will also constitute a new form of collective sales arrangement, with
"users pay[ing] upfront fees [for] broad access rights to options with-
out regard to publisher," which has gradually become the norm for
newspapers, music, movies, and television.257 Meanwhile, the offering
of a consumer subscription service is unlikely to result in anticompeti-
tive effects. As discussed previously in the context of institutional
subscription, Google's refusal to offer tailor-made licenses at lower
prices than the full-access subscription should not raise concerns of
255. Drummond Testimony, supra note 242, at 8.
256. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.7(c).
257. Timothy J. Brennan, The Proposed Google Book Settlement: Assessing Exclusionary Ef-
fects, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. Oct. 2009, at 7.
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anticompetitive tying or bundled pricing. It is true that Google will
have de facto exclusivity over orphan works offered as part of its con-
sumer subscription service (similar to its institutional subscription),
but as explained above, such exclusivity is necessary to preserve the
incentives for business enterprises like Google to undertake risky and
innovative projects in the future. The exclusivity does not entail that
Google will proceed to raise consumer subscription fees to supracom-
petitive levels for two reasons: (1) Google's pricing decisions will be
always be constrained by the need to promote its brand and greater
use of its search engine;258 and (2) the free access that individuals have
to public library resources as a last resort.
The third new revenue model involves a joint venture between
Google, the Registry and university copy shops whereby the copy
shops will be granted access to GBS content for an annual fee per
concurrent user and a fee per printed page.25 9 Since the mid-1990s
Circuit Court decision in Princeton University Press,260 copy shops
have no longer been able rely on the fair use defense under the Copy-
right Act to reproduce academic course packs and have since then
either affiliated with established clearance services (examples being
Copyright Clearance Center and University Readers) or proactively
obtained copyright clearances on behalf of course instructors. 261 If
copy shops are now given the option to clear copyrights by accessing
and copying books through the GBS system, Google will divert part of
the copyright royalties (most likely thirty-seven percent by default)
from the rightsholders. However, this does not necessarily raise con-
cerns of free riding or disincentives for authorship. If the right-
sholders consider sixty-three percent to be too low a percentage to
compensate them for their authorship efforts-even after accounting
for the possible output increase due to professors including more
book excepts in course packs as they become cheaper-rightsholders
are always free to request for an upward adjustment in revenue split
or their books to be dropped form the GBS system altogether. On the
other hand, since copy shops are spared from obtaining individual
clearances for every book that goes into a course pack, there will be
huge savings in transaction costs which could in turn be translated into
cheaper course packs and more extensive use of books as reading
258. Elhauge, supra note 38, at 55.
259. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 4.8(b).
260. See 99 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (6th Cir. 1996).
261. Copyright and Fair Use Overview: Academic and Education Permissions: Academic
Coursepacks, STAN. U., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright andFairUseOverview/chapter7/
7-a.html (last visited May 2, 2011).
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materials, ultimately benefiting both students (who pay a lower price)
and rightsholders (who earn higher revenue due to output expansion).
Lastly, commentators are expecting Google to offer innovative ser-
vices which are either complements or derivatives of the GBS pro-
ject. 2 6 2 These include four services: (1) improving search algorithms
used in Google's web-search service; (2) displaying parts of GBS
books as search results; (3) developing improved automatic transla-
tion services for GBS books and web pages generally; and (4) inte-
grating the GBS system with communication devices (including web
browsers, email, and social networking tools). 2 6 3 Google is authorized
under the settlement agreement to develop these complementary or
derivative services as part of its right to engage in "Non-Display
Uses," which means "uses that do not display Expression from Digital
Copies of Books or Inserts to the public." 264
These new or improved services are qualitative-efficiency-enhanc-
ing and courts should encourage the services as part of the GBS settle-
ment insofar as competitors (e.g., Yahoo and Microsoft) equally have
the opportunity to carry out similar research to develop competing
services. Indeed, the settlement agreement does provide for the crea-
tion of a "Research Corpus" for non-consumptive and non-commer-
cial research by qualified users.265 "Non-Consumptive Research"
refers to "research in which computational analysis is performed on
... Books, but not research in which a researcher ... understand[s]
the intellectual content presented within the Book,"266 which is pre-
cisely the type of research that Google is expecting to perform as
"Non-Display Uses" of GBS books.267 However, the limitations im-
posed on the use of the Research Corpus are problematic and provide
opportunities for Google to block its competitors from engaging in
innovative research.268 First, a fine distinction is drawn between
"[clommercial exploitation of algorithms developed when performing
Non-Consumptive Research," which is permissible, 269 and "direct, for
profit, commercial use of information extracted from Books," which is
prohibited unless the user has express consent from both Google and
262. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 128, at 394-95; Samuelson, supra note 128, at 1354; Suarez,
supra note 216, at 209-13.
263. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 128, at 394-95; Samuelson, supra note 128, at 1354; Suarez,
supra note 216, at 209-13.
264. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 1.94.
265. Id. § 7.2(d)(i), (iii).
266. Id. § 1.93.
267. Picker, supra note 128, at 394-95.
268. Id. at 395.
269. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 7.2(d)(x).
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the Registry.270 Ironically, it would seem that any improvement in
search or translation algorithms necessarily requires "information ex-
tracted from books." 271 Even more problematic is the express prohi-
bition against "[u]se of data extracted from . . . Books . . . to provide
services to the public or a third party that compete with services of-
fered by the Rightsholder[s]... or Google." 272 In any event, Google's
competitors-the majority being "for-profit entities"-must seek con-
sent from both Google and Registry to become "qualified users" of
the Research Corpus.273
It is submitted these restrictions on competitors' access to the Re-
search Corpus should be removed so that Google will not be insulated
from competitive pressures to innovate. Judge Hand famously re-
marked in the Alcoa case "that possession of unchallenged economic
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to
industrial progress[.]" 274 Admittedly, there is some degree of free rid-
ing when competitors make commercial use of the Research Corpus
for Internet services which compete with Google, but the extent of
free riding must be weighed against the amount of effort that competi-
tors must put in before they can develop an innovative search or
translation service based on information extracted from the GBS
database. Contrast this to the decision of empowering the Registry or
the UWF to license any intermediary who wishes to sell digitized or-
phan works in competition with Google; not only would the free-rid-
ing problem be serious, but it would also take little effort for a
competitor to set up a website allowing consumers to order digital
copies of orphan works under a just-in-time inventory business model
(under which books are only scanned after receiving an order so that
the competitor will not face the high fixed costs of digitizing every
book in the world). In contrast to the above analysis, which rejects
the idea of granting orphan work licenses to new entrants, there is no
convincing reason to provide Google with exclusivity over the re-
search and development of ancillary Internet services. One should
note that courts should discourage free-riding only to the extent nec-
essary to allow Google to capture sufficient returns for recouping its
270. Id. § 7.2(d)(viii).
271. Picker, supra note 128, at 395.
272. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 7.2(d)(ix).
273. Id. §§ 1.123, 7.2(d)(xi).
274. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
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upfront investment, but not the full value of Google's initial
innovation.275
Some commentators are concerned about potential tying arrange-
ments between GBS and complementary and derivative services (e.g.,
web search, translation, communication tools) also offered by Google.
For example, Suarez is worried that "[GBS] is tied to Google Web
Search when Google Web Search includes results from books in its
results pages," because "Google could [thereby] further entrench its
monopoly power over the purchase of digitized books."276 But if GBS
is the tied product, there could not be anticompetitive foreclosure in
the tied product market provided that Google also displays links to
competing book databases (e.g. Amazon.com, websites of physical
bookstores, catalogs of university and public libraries) as part of web
search results, though reasonable disputes could arise regarding the
ordering of results. On the other hand, Judge Chin raised in the judg-
ment rejecting the settlement the concern that "Google's ability to
deny competitors the ability to search orphan books would further
entrench Google's market power in the online search market." 277 If
web search service is viewed as the tied product, as the Judge seems to
suggest, this effectively amounts to a claim that Google should allow
users to search the GBS database using the search engine or algorithm
of its competitor (e.g., that of Yahoo or Bing). But an anticompetitive
tie-in cannot possibly be made out because the GBS database and the
search function are technologically integrated and do not constitute
separate products.
Alternatively, if the tied product is translation service, we could im-
agine a situation where a competitor of Google makes use of the Re-
search Corpus to develop a powerful automatic translation tool that
can be used 6n GBS books and other Internet content. Provided that
computer users can successfully install this translation program and
use it to translate GBS books by clicking a web-browser button, there
could be no anticompetitive foreclosure by tying. Google would only
be blocking its competitors if it refuses to provide the necessary pro-
gram codes and interoperability information for the development of a
GBS-translation software, thereby forcing readers to use Google's
own translation tool on GBS content. On the other hand, it would be
going too far to require Google to display competing translation tools
on the same webpage, or web browser, in which GBS books are
275. ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HAND-
BOOK, 128-29 (2007).
276. Suarez, supra note 216, at 210.
277. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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viewed online, as competitors would then be free-riding on Google's
promotional efforts (unless competitors pay Google for advertising
their translation products). In sum, while the GBS project will inevi-
tably have spillover benefits for Google in promoting wider use of its
complementary or derivative services-which courts should en-
courage as an add-on to the present settlement-the concern for an-
ticompetitive tying is absent provided that competitors can still engage
in the research and development of Internet search, translation, and
communication products which interact with the GBS system.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has established the analogy between the GBS settlement
and the ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses in the music industry and
emphasized the importance of evaluating the antitrust issues of the
GBS dispute in its broader context of copyright collectives. It has ar-
gued that the LRA analysis-as a "maximizing" test-is preferred to
the "satisficing" overall-efficiency test as the normative standard for
applying the antitrust rule of reason in the present context, and how
concerns of increasing decision error costs and chilling procompetitive
behavior can be effectively addressed through doctrinal, legislative,
and institutional adjustments. This paper has also developed a rule of
reason framework for evaluating and balancing the anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects of the ancillary restraints to the GBS set-
tlement and copyright collectives generally. It embraces a "reverse"
rule of reason analysis asking whether efficiency-enhancing modifica-
tions can be made to render the collective arrangement even more
procompetitive. A substantial part of the present paper is devoted to
a thorough, rule of reason analysis of the central anticompetitive con-
cerns of the GBS settlement and certain proposed modifications sug-
gested by Google and commentators. Perhaps surprising to many
readers, it concludes that Google's de facto exclusivity over orphan
works and its pricing mechanisms for consumer purchases and institu-
tional subscriptions are legitimate under antitrust law and should be
upheld (without substitution of an LRA) by an antitrust or settle-
ment-approval court. Indeed, this result is not immediately obvious
unless and until a full fledged rule of reason evaluation is conducted in
the manner suggested in this paper.
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